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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR PRAISES SCIENTISTS' CALL FOR HALT TO STAR WARS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3,
Mar 86 (signed to press 12 Feb 86) pp 75-77

[Article by V. Ustinov: "Authoritative Voice of Scientists Opposed to 'Star Wars'"]

[Text] Washington's policy aimed at the creation of an antimissile system with space-based components is causing ever increasing concern in the world. There is a strengthening recognition in very broad circles of the world community that the propagandist rhetoric surrounding the "strategic defense initiative" (SDI) conceals an intention to extend the arms race to a new sphere--space--and break up the evolved military-strategic parity. A reflection of this concern was, in particular, the UN General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1985 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

An authoritative voice in support of the forces advocating the use of space solely for peaceful purposes was heard from London, where in December 1985 the 47th symposium within the framework of the Pugwash movement of scientists was held, which examined technical and military-political aspects of the creation of strategic antimissile systems, primarily the American SDI program. Fifty prominent representatives of science and public figures from 14 countries--Great Britain, Hungary, Egypt, Italy, Canada, Mexico, the Netherlands, USSR, United States, FRG, France, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Sweden--took part in the symposium. The Soviet scientific community was represented by a delegation headed by Academician Ye.P. Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Particular attention in the course of the discussion was devoted to the potential impact of programs for the creation of space-based antimissile systems on compliance with the commitments ensuing from the American-Soviet 1972 Treaty Limiting ABM Systems (ABM Treaty) and also on other current and future arms control agreements. The possible consequences of West European states' participation in the American SDI program were studied also.

Having analyzed the essence of the problem in detail, the authoritative representatives of world science came to the following disturbing conclusion reflected in the statement of the Pugwash Executive Committee on the results of the symposium: "The world stands on the brink of a concentrated expansion of the nuclear arms race, including the spread of this mortally dangerous

contest to space. This new dimension of the nuclear threat arises from the prospect of ABM systems undermining the ABM Treaty, spurring an unlimited contest in the sphere of offensive and defensive arms on Earth and in space, destroying en route the entire system of existing arms control agreements, increasing the likelihood of nuclear war and unjustifiably squandering the scientific, technological and economic resources of a large part of the industrially developed world."

The participants in the symposium agreed that such a development of events could still be avoided, but little time for its prevention is left. The speakers emphasized that in the current situation what is needed primarily is strict compliance with the ABM Treaty, which bans the development and testing of sea, air, space and mobile ground-based ABM systems and components, and also the strategic ceilings established by the SALT II Treaty. It was noted that compliance with the terms of these treaties constitutes an essential prerequisite of progress in questions of military detente and consolidation and realization of the elements of mutual understanding which have surfaced at the meeting in Geneva. The scientists advocated the speediest implementation of such steps as the banning of the further testing and deployment of antisatellite weapons and an all-embracing ban on nuclear testing.

Many participants in the symposium deemed it necessary to recall that the ABM Treaty between the United States and the USSR recorded the recognition that either party opting for a policy of creating space-based ABM systems would ultimately merely lessen its security, having provoked an unchecked offensive and defensive arms race. This conclusion is based on the obvious vulnerability of such systems to a first strike and, on the other hand, on the dangers of the illusion of impunity born of their deployment. Furthermore, any defensive shields could be overcome by a new generation of offensive weapons and could essentially prompt their creation. This means that mutual vulnerability of the population of the two sides to nuclear attack would remain the basis of strategic restraint. In other words, in response to the claims of the U.S. Administration and other SDI supporters concerning the feasibility and expediency of space-based ABM systems the symposium pointed out unequivocally that from the technical viewpoint the hopes of the possibility of thus escaping from mutual vulnerability are absolutely groundless.

In addition, almost all serious analysts, the meeting observed, agree that even the very narrow goal of partial defense of retaliatory strike forces could be achieved only given a restrained, limited retaliatory response. In other words, special joint arms control measures would be required. However, the participants believe, if such cooperation is possible, it would be far more logical to embark directly and immediately on measures to ease the nuclear confrontation, thereby avoiding tremendous political complications, material costs and, finally, an exacerbation of the threat of general catastrophe. It should be borne in mind here that the deployment of ABM systems with space-based components would lead to such a far-reaching destabilization of the international situation as would almost certainly render impossible any arms control measures whatever.

The statement of the Pugwash Executive Committee points out that the ABM Treaty is clearly in danger. The U.S. Administration is heading toward renunciation thereof or a radical change in its interpretation on the basis of open implementation of strategic defense programs which it prohibits. The United States' alarming activity in the field of the deployment of early warning and tracking electronic systems and also a system of antimissile defense of the territory of the entire country and the development and testing of antisatellite and various types of antimissile weapons is fraught with the threat of circumvention of the limitations established by the treaty.

It was emphasized particularly at the symposium that loss of the ABM Treaty would be a real disaster. It would almost inevitably lead to the destruction of the entire system of arms control agreements, which is fragile enough as it is and a central element of which is the treaty and which has up to now secured a certain minimum of restraint in the nuclear arms buildup. Primarily the SALT II Treaty would progressively lose its significance together with the tremendous quantitative and qualitative growth of nuclear arsenals. Under these conditions the threat of renunciation of compliance with the Moscow Treaty Banning Tests of Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water (1963) and the Treaty on the Principles of States' Activity in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (1967) would become real. There would also probably be increased pressure on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Further, serious damage would be done to the prospects of the conclusion of new agreements in the disarmament sphere--a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests and a treaty banning or limiting antisatellite weapons. It would be impossible to avoid an extraordinarily costly and dangerous arms race in space.

The participants in the meeting called for strict observance of the ABM Treaty and the use in this connection of the possibilities of the mechanism of the Soviet-American Permanent Consultative Commission and recommended additional measures in respect of the limitation of antisatellite weapons, emphasizing that tests of such could serve to conceal the creation of space-based ABM defenses. The best solution of the problem would be, as was pointed out, an all-embracing ban on the testing and deployment of antisatellite weapon systems. Such an agreement would be easier to monitor than an agreement permitting limited numbers of such arms.

The statement of the Pugwash Executive Committee reflects the serious concern which exists in connection with the American SDI program in West European public and political circles.

It was emphasized at the London meeting that the SDI program will place in the economic respect also a heavy burden on the United States and its allies which prove to be involved in this project. In the opinion of the participants, the U.S. Administration should recognize this and direct its efforts into the peaceful use of space and the establishment of cooperation with the Soviet Union in this sphere. Such cooperation would strengthen mutual trust and could be of great benefit to all mankind.

The appeal of the authoritative representatives of world science for the prevention of an arms race in space is a serious warning to all who would like to use this new sphere of man's activity for selfish aggressive purposes and to the detriment of terrestrial civilization.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET WEEKLY CALLS EDI 'EUROPEAN VARIANT' OF SDI

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 17, 5 May 86 pp 22-25

[Article by Dmitry Pogorzelsky]

[Text]

For three years now SDI — President Reagan's notorious military-political concept which from the start was aptly described as the "star wars" programme — has been the subject of heated debates, even among the United States' West European allies whom Washington has set out to involve in the project. About a year ago when discussion of whether to take part in it or not was at its height another idea cropped up, at first in vague terms but now already with the quite definite designation of European Defence Initiative or EDI. What exactly is it?

Washington Manoeuvre

Western Europe's initial reaction to the "star wars" plan was by and large negative. It was felt that it could only upset strategic stability worldwide and sharply increase the risk of a nuclear conflict. This was a perfectly natural reaction prompted by common sense.

Even diehard devotees of U.S. strategy feared that if SDI were realized there would be two levels of security — one for the United States under cover of its space "shield" and the other for Western Europe, which, being outside that "shield," would not be protected against a possible retaliatory strike. For the space umbrella as conceived by the U.S. could offer protection (questionable, at that) only from a retaliatory strike by intercontinental ballistic missiles. It would be powerless against other types of nuclear weapon carriers

— aircraft, medium-range, cruise and tactical missiles.

Washington continued to boost the project, inviting its allies to take part in it. Some of them refused outright, others were slow to give an answer. To reassure the recalcitrant allies, the U.S. military announced last summer that they would take "a closer look at Europe's missile problems." And in the autumn General James Abrahamson, director of the SDI organization, speaking at the Pentagon, said that "alternative variants" were being considered in the U.S. Among other things, he mentioned a project for a land-based system for the defence of the "theatre of hostilities" (as the U.S. terms the European continent). In early February this year the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crow, said that means of countering short-range ballistic missiles were being studied within the SDI framework "in deference to the wishes of the European members of NATO."

In other words, a military-political manoeuvre was devised to ensure the fullest participation of the West European countries in the "star wars" plan. Moreover, Washington preferred to have the idea emanate not from the U.S. but from some West European ally, as had been the case time and again before. Recall if only the fact that some 10 years ago the then F.R.G. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was the first to talk about the "new threat to Western Europe" allegedly presented by the Soviet medium-range missiles. Wash-

ington used this as a pretext for deploying its new first-strike nuclear missiles on the continent.

This time the U.S. did not have to cast about long for an executor of its strategy. There was no better choice than Bonn.

The Wörner Proposal...

The idea of a "European defence initiative" was first advanced in the F.R.G. last summer. It was seized upon by Alfred Dregger, Franz Josef Strauss and other right-wing CDU/CSU politicians. By the end of November Defence Minister Manfred Wörner already had on his desk a study prepared by Bundeswehr headquarters proposing the creation of a new air defence system impenetrable by aircraft and cruise, tactical and medium-range missiles. Wörner took the idea to a NATO Council session in Brussels where he urged the allies to embark on the realization of EDI as a component of the American programme. The allies reacted coolly to the proposition. Not so NATO Supreme Commander in Europe General Bernard Rogers, who was enthusiastic about it.

What exactly did Wörner propose? NATO, he said, must be able to "defend itself against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles," it must possess "the means of defence against cruise missiles and other weapons." A West European anti-missile defence system was not only urgently needed but "technologically feasible," he averred. The first stage was to be the modernization of the U.S. Patriot anti-aircraft systems deployed by NATO on the continent and the replacement of the obsolete Hawk and Roland-1 air defence missiles with new systems capable of coping with all types of missiles. A beginning had already been made — the F.R.G. had been working together with the U.S. for several years on developing such systems.

But there could be no stopping at this "relatively conservative solution to the problem," Wörner argued. The future belonged to new technologies, lasers and electromagnetic systems. The U.S., he said, would automatically have to take part in developing these systems "inasmuch as it has a large contingent

of its armed forces here." The minister's logic was simple: with the growing threat of a retaliatory strike at U.S. armed forces and installations on the continent, the allies on the territory of which first-strike missiles are sited should not be mere bystanders.

Thus, Western Europe is being urged to create its own technologically up-to-date land-based ABM systems. And to do so even before SDI is realized! The overall picture, then, is this: the SDI "shield" is to provide cover from a retaliatory strike for the United States' steadily expanding strategic potential on its own territory while the planned West European anti-missile cover is to serve as an additional "shield," primarily for the U.S. nuclear-missile strength on the continent.

This is essentially a cunning device by means of which Washington is out to involve its allies in the most dangerous of its schemes, namely, to undermine the 1972 Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of ABM systems. Direct participation in SDI would mean complicity in violating this treaty which is the recognized foundation of strategic stability. The deployment of an ABM system in Western Europe is not proscribed by treaty arrangements, a fact which is gleefully stressed also by Wörner, who underscores the European origin of this new plan for stepping up the arms race on the European continent. But what are the real origins of the "European initiative" with which Bonn is supplementing the "star wars" plan?

...and the Old Prescriptions

In the autumn of 1980 Professor David Yost of the U.S. Naval Academy toured three European countries — the F.R.G., Britain and France. Shortly after his return, he published a study in which he wrote that the Atlantic alliance urgently needed the means of defence against tactical missiles in order to protect the new NATO medium-range missiles and also important ground installations — airfields, nuclear weapons storage facilities, command centres and control and communications systems.

It will be recalled that a year earlier the fateful decision was taken to station in Western Europe a new generation of U.S. first-strike nuclear weapons — Pershing 2 and cruise missiles. The

decision evoked a storm of protest in Western Europe against the new round in the arms race sparked off by Washington. For this reason, Dr Yost, after having talked to officials in the three countries, concluded that if the U.S. wanted to create a cover for its missiles it was politically advisable not to talk about it — at any rate not before the missiles appeared on the European continent. And this, according to the Pentagon plan, was to happen — and did happen — towards the end of 1983. In the meantime the best course was to keep silent, Yost said. And he hinted that the optimal setting in this situation would be a CDU/CSU government in the Federal Republic.

In October 1982 a change in government did occur in Bonn. The conservative bloc that took over proceeded vigorously to give effect to the U.S. plans. Manfred Wörner became Minister of Defence and before 1982 was out he had before him a document dealing precisely with new weapon systems. It is noteworthy that involved in the preparation of this study was the Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm concern, one of the main contractors for the F.R.G. Defence Ministry. It was revealed that MBB, together with two other military-industrial complex giants, Siemens and Telefunken, was already working on relevant research and development programmes.

A year later a research group headed by Professor Fred Hoffman issued a report in the U.S. which for the first time openly spoke of the need to create an anti-missile belt in Europe based on the Patriot air defence systems. Meanwhile work was already under way in the U.S. on a new antitactical missile programme for which the President had asked for \$700 million to be appropriated for the period up to 1988. In mid-1984 Bonn became the first of America's West European allies to conclude an agreement with Washington on the purchase of Patriot systems.

But this is just the beginning. The main emphasis has been placed on the development of weapons systems based on the latest technology. That is why Washington is so anxious to involve its European allies in SDI, bent on drawing on their scientific and technological potential, on laying hands on all the latest achievements in Western Europe. And in this the F.R.G. is actively helping the U.S.

The Concerns Reveal Their Hand

For some time European research in this field was wrapped in secrecy. But now that EDI is talked about openly and the governments of the United States' principal allies take a favourable view of the participation of their firms in SDI, the concerns are revealing their hands.

Citing a study by the European subsidiary of the American High Frontier organization, which vigorously lobbies for SDI, the West German *Der Spiegel* says that the prime objects of research are a high-energy laser weapon and a rapid-fire electromagnetic gun. Several European research organizations are working on these projects. In the Federal Republic the MBB and Diehl firms have jointly produced a working model of such a laser weapon. The American Aviation Week and Space Technology directly links it with the "star wars" programme. Another Defence Ministry contractor, the Dornier aerospace firm, has already developed for use on board shuttle ships a precision-targeting system for space-based weapons. The same firm has offered to develop a laser operating on free electrons. The American SDI strategists jumped at it. Not to be left behind, MBB has demonstrated a model of a chemical laser installation for tanks. "The F.R.G. should play the leading role in the EDI programme," Henns-Arnt Vogels, chairman of the board of MBB, has observed.

But Bonn is not the only claimant to final role.

Readied for Military Use

When President Mitterrand of France advanced in April 1985 the Eureka plan for the coordination of research in Western Europe, Paris went out of its way to emphasize the civilian character of the project. But already then there were suspicions that a "military uniform" was being prepared for it. Now these suspicions have been reinforced.

At the end of 1985 the then French Defence Minister Paul Quilès, speaking of SDI, observed that France and other West European countries were working on similar projects.

The proposal to set up a European military research centre for Eureka came from Paris. It was made by Jean-Louis Gergorin, adviser to the president of the French war industry concern Matra, which, incidentally, is controlled by the state. And in mid-January Paris, through Quilès, gave its blessing to the participation of French firms in SDI.

When the Wörner project appeared, military cooperation between the F.R.G. and France was given a new impetus. For some time it seemed that the F.R.G., unwilling to anger its overseas patron, took a sceptical view of the Eureka project. But in time it transpired that Washington's attitude both to Eureka and the Bonn-Paris alliance was benevolent. Bonn is playing on two chess boards at once and its support of Eureka is far stronger than might appear at first glance. The F.R.G. is today becoming a bridge between Eureka and the "star wars" programme. Latterly other such bridges have been appearing.

The prospects thus opened are becoming increasingly attractive to the powerful European military-industrial complex, which sees a source of lush profits in the new technologies. This applies primarily to firms that are out to participate simultaneously in both SDI and Eureka. Siemens and MBB (F.R.G.), Thomson (France), Philips (Holland) and General Electric (Britain), for example, have formed a special consortium for the purpose. The same has been done by eight leading Italian aerospace firms.

That EDI is taking shape is evident from numerous recent developments. For instance, according to *Le Figaro*, research conducted at the Franco-German ballistic institute has already produced a powerful impulse laser which experts say is the most advanced in Europe. At the meeting between F.R.G. Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President François Mitterrand, Kohl proposed setting up a commission to work out a project for a "European defence system to intercept short-range missiles." In other words, the Paris-Bonn alliance is entering a new, "missile" level.

Another Objective

Washington and NATO are out to bring "star wars" down to earth in

pursuance of still another objective. "Space shield technology introduces numerous revolutionary changes in the sphere of conventional armaments," the Italian *Europeo* journal wrote citing a secret report submitted to the government stressing the need for the most up-to-date sensors and reconnaissance, command and control systems. Konrad Snitz, head of the planning division of the F.R.G. Foreign Ministry, put it plainly when he said that technologies suitable for the "development of 'intelligent' weapons... carrier and reconnaissance systems for NATO's FOFA concept" could be worked out in the EDI framework.

FOFA, the NATO name for the doctrine of "strikes at second echelons" of the enemy, was worked out several years ago by the Pentagon and subsequently imposed on the West European allies. It provides for combined "preventive" strikes, involving the use of nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons, at targets 400-500 kilometres deep in rear areas of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

Its adoption by NATO as an official doctrine was preceded by the Rogers plan for building up the bloc's conventional armaments, which called for a 3 per cent annual increase of military spending by the members of the alliance. This conventional buildup was presented as evidence of NATO's striving to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons. Actually, however, it was nothing of the kind. Besides, how could a political problem be resolved by purely technical means?

Moreover, the new generation of weapons based on the latest technology, by virtue of its tactical and technical features, erases the dividing line between nuclear and conventional weapons and further erodes security on the European continent. Even Western experts admit that the FOFA concept greatly increases the risk of conflict and its rapid escalation. The fate of the Europeans would be in the hands of computers.

• • •

Thus, the European Defence Initiative, in the form in which it is presented today, is a complex military-technical programme aimed at gaining superiority over the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries.

Realization of EDI, as of SDI, would lead to a new race between offensive and defensive armaments in the sphere of Eurostrategic and tactical missiles. As a result, the security of our continent would be seriously undermined. The West European countries, and primarily the F.R.G., would assume a large part of the responsibility for escalating the ABM treaty.

Evidently the time to start giving wide publicity to EDI has been deliberately chosen. Just when some positive signs of progress have appeared at the Stockholm and Vienna talks, and when the U.S.S.R. is exerting every effort to cut the Gordian knot of disarmament, Western Europe is being dragged into a new round of the arms race that would make it extremely difficult to reach agreement on the full range of questions relating to arms control. The label "European" does not save Wörner's scheme. The world has seen many such plans—recall the European Army, the European Defence Community and other attempts to push through, under arresting names, dangerous plans which essentially conflict with the interests of the European countries.

The fact that Bonn is sponsoring the latest militarist project is a cause for serious concern, considering that there is persistent talk in the corridors of power on the Rhine of the German question still being open and revanchist designs are still being harboured there.

Lastly, the new design undermines the principles the leaders of the U.S.S.R.

and the United States declared for in Geneva where both sides spoke of the need to renounce the striving for military superiority, and to prevent the outbreak of war, nuclear or conventional. The EDI plan clearly runs counter to these objectives.

The talk about the new "initiative" being aimed at strengthening security on the continent does not hold water for the simple reason that its underlying principle of "arms against arms" is fallacious. To adhere to this dogma in our day means only to aggravate the situation, to heighten the risk of conflict. "The character of present-day weaponry leaves no country with any hope of safeguarding itself solely with military and technical means, for example, by building up a defence, even the most powerful," the political report of the Central Committee to the 27th Congress of the CPSU emphasizes. Today security can be ensured only by political means.

The Soviet Union is ready to do this. Mikhail Gorbachev's January 13 statement set forth a clear-cut and concrete plan for the stage-by-stage creation of a nuclear-free world. It provides among other things for the elimination of both medium-range and tactical missiles. The U.S.S.R. is ready also to negotiate a radical reduction of conventional armaments. This is a truly European initiative. Only in this way, and not by a headlong drive for new types of armaments, can the security of our continent be ensured.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: ITALIAN GENERAL SAYS U.S. DOES NOT NEED 'STRATEGIC DEFENSE'

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 19, 19 May 86 pp 26-27

[Article by Nino Pasti]

[Text]

Propaganda disseminated abroad by the United States Information Agency (USIA) is far from being the least dangerous weapon in the arsenal of the Reagan Administration. With its staff of 7,800 employees and a budget of about one billion dollars this year, USIA has offices and radio stations throughout the world. The main task of the agency is constantly to accuse the Soviet Union of actions the U.S. itself is committing or is preparing to commit. All this is done to represent U.S. militarist activity as "necessary defence" and thereby mislead world public opinion.

At present, for the first time in 25 years, USIA is broadcasting propaganda into Western Europe 24 hours a day. Considerable extra efforts are evidently needed to make Washington's allies, and especially the non-aligned countries in Europe, accept the "star wars" programme and counter the latest constructive proposals advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev.

I therefore think it necessary to re-establish the truth by turning to official American documents, and the work of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, which U.S. officials consider "neutral and respectable" for the very good reason that it is not neutral but pro-American.

"We were the first with atomic explosive, long-range missiles, multiple warheads on the same launcher, and miniaturized circuitry permitting greater destruction with smaller weapons," ex-president Carter writes in his memoirs. His evidence irrefutably proves

that it was the Americans who set the infernal train of the arms race going and continue to accelerate its motion. It also proves that the Soviet Union was compelled to take part in this race so as not to allow the United States to gain dangerous superiority. In other words, the Soviet Union, by a reasonable and necessary buildup of its armaments, helped to maintain "nuclear peace."

Which of the two powers has from the outset held the lead in the number of strategic nuclear warheads? Warheads capable of destroying enemy objectives at a first or second (that is, retaliatory) strike. For it is the number of such warheads that determines the nuclear balance. Top American leaders, President Reagan and Defence Secretary Weinberger in the first instance, have repeatedly stated that the United States suspended the production of this type of armament in 1965, whereas the Soviet Union continued to manufacture warheads at a rapid pace, thereby creating dangerous superiority. Thus, attempts are being made to justify America's accelerated nuclear rearmament as a forced measure aimed at restoring the balance.

To ascertain the truth, I have studied the reports of several defence secretaries annually presented to Congress in support of the Pentagon's budget demands. Many reports give the numbers

of strategic nuclear warheads possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. I established that the U.S. never ceased to manufacture strategic nuclear weapons and always had them in quantities considerably in excess of the stockpiles of such weapons in the Soviet Union. But that is not all, because the buildup of armaments was accompanied by the qualitative improvement of the weapons. For instance, the 550 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles Minuteman-2 were transformed into Minuteman-3 missiles by replacing the old nuclear charge with three new independently targetable warheads. Later on, 300 Minuteman-3 missiles were modernized, their warheads becoming more accurate and powerful.

On atomic submarines the old Polaris missiles were replaced by improved missiles of the Poseidon type, and at present the Poseidons are being replaced by new, C-4 missiles. Such new types of weapons have been tested and are now in production as the MX Intercontinental ballistic missile and the Trident submarine with 24 launchers, as against 16 on previous models. The Trident submarine is equipped with C-4 missiles, and a new missile, the D-5, is being developed.

A new strategic bomber, the B-1, has been built, and the B-52 has been modified to carry the latest cruise missiles. Surface ships and submarines are now also equipped with cruise missiles. No one should be misled by the fact that there has been no quantitative growth of armaments since 1978. This is so not because arms production has been halted but because old types of weapons are being upgraded and new ones developed. "As U.S. strategic modernization programmes are deployed, the U.S. warheads advantage grows and the Soviet equivalent megatonnage diminishes or disappears," former Defence Secretary Harold Brown wrote on this score.

In his reports to Congress the present Defence Secretary, Casper Wein-

berger, does not give figures on the number of warheads possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he asserts that "President Reagan's programme for strategic forces ... will give us the greatest addition of modern strengthened forces planned and funded by any United States President."

According to data cited by Military Balance in one of its autumn issues for 1984, the United States had 10,299 strategic nuclear warheads at the time: 52 per cent of them on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 27 per cent on strategic bombers, and 21 per cent on land-based intercontinental strategic missiles.

The Reagan Administration claims that the nuclear rearmament of the United States has been prompted by the need to strengthen the deterrent factor which, it says, is levelled down by Soviet superiority (nonexistent, as was shown above). What results could a first Soviet nuclear strike have? The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff replied to this question as follows: "Analyses project that a Soviet strike against U.S. missile fields could destroy a major portion of the U.S. ICBM forces, if the U.S. chooses to ride out the attack before responding. However, the Soviets would still have to contend with the U.S. SLBM—secure and survivable at sea—and the manned bombers that had been launched for survival at the first confirmed warning of attack."

In other words, even if a first Soviet strike could destroy all American land-based nuclear forces (which is actually impossible), the U.S. would preserve all its air- and submarine-based forces, or 79 per cent of its strategic nuclear potential. (It is in place to recall here that Moscow has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons—Ed.)

A first strike at the United States would inevitably be suicidal for the Soviet Union. Hence the American deterrent factor need not be strengthened with a "star wars" programme.

In spite of its more advantageous geostrategic position and superiority in nuclear armaments, there is obviously no question of the U.S. being able to wipe out all Soviet strategic forces with a first strike. Taking into account the huge destructive power of a nuclear explosion, even a moderate Soviet retaliation would cause substantial damage to the United States.

The aim of the "star wars" programme is to build a shield against the Soviet weapons that would survive a first American strike. Consequently, the United States would be able to destroy the Soviet Union and inevitably the whole of Europe, avoiding any substantial damage to itself. Only in such an event could there be any sense in "star wars" (if there can be any sense in lunacy—Ed.).

But President Reagan has miscalculated because the Soviet Union will never allow dangerous superiority over itself either on earth or in space. The real danger of the "star wars" programme is that it extends the arms race to outer space and escalates it on earth. As a result, instability and mutual distrust will grow. The "star wars" will be fought at a truly cosmic speed beyond man's control, and this considerably increases the danger of a nuclear war by mistake.

Rome

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CSO: 5200/1401

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET WEEKLY INTERVIEWS FRG GREENS LEADER ON SDI

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 17, 5 May 86 p 12

[Text]

A delegation from the Green Party, F.R.G., comprising its co-chairmen Lukas Beckmann, Jutta Dittfert and Rainer Trampert, and Norbert Kossede, a member of the board, has visited the U.S.S.R. at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee. The guests met with Soviet party leaders and statesmen. Before the delegation's departure, our reporter Roman Krestyaninov had a talk with LUKAS BECKMANN.

Herr Beckmann, as far as I know this is your first time in our country. What are your main impressions?

The size and diversity of your country are striking. Leningrad, especially Piskaryovo Cemetery, where about 500,000 victims of German nazism are buried, made the deepest impression on us. Although many of the Greens are young people, nazism is recent history for them. We want our present and our future to have no room for such phenomena.

So you weren't in two minds about the answer to the question of whether May 8 had brought the Germans liberation or defeat?

It was the day of liberation for all of us. The Greens were bitterly disappointed by the way the F.R.G. ruling parties observed the 40th anniversary of the surrender of the Wehrmacht. Reagan's visit to Bitburg and Bergen-Belsen came as a terrible shock to us. Only the statement by Federal President von Weizsäcker was an encouraging exception.

How did your meetings and talks with Soviet leaders impress you? Did you prove to have views in common on vital international issues?

We had very interesting, frank and

lively talks in the course of which we discussed peace, protection of the environment, economic progress and other topical issues. The Soviet disarmament proposals were in the focus of attention. I must say that our views on the cardinal issues connected with the strengthening of peace and security largely coincided. However, we didn't quite see eye to eye on how to approach the problem of unilateral disarmament.

What is your attitude to Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals for a stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, ending nuclear tests, preventing the militarization of outer space and withdrawing intermediate-range missiles from Europe?

We in the F.R.G. have wholeheartedly welcomed all the proposals in Mikhail Gorbachev's January 15 statement. They are of an extremely positive character and could bring about a historic breakthrough in the matter of disarmament. What is needed now is a positive response from the other side. The proposal to end nuclear tests is an excellent chance which the Americans have not so far taken up. Hopefully, the West European countries will ultimately manage to press the American government into revising its position. Regrettably, the current U.S. Administration is not interested in disarmament. Therefore the

Soviet proposal that negotiations on intermediate-range missiles be started independently of the SDI issue imparts a very important nuance to this aspect of disarmament. The putting forward of a European initiative becomes possible, because in this matter Western Europe is less dependent on the Americans than it is in others. Will this be enough? Time will show.

How have you taken the American resumption of nuclear tests in Nevada?

Technically, politically, militarily and strategically, the easiest way to get the disarmament process going is by ending nuclear tests. The fact that this proposal has brought no political response is scandalous.

What is your attitude to the SDI programme and the Americans' attempts to involve their West European allies in its implementation?

We object to the SDI programme and to the West European countries' involvement in it. We do not want the F.R.G. government to take part in it. SDI is a military rather than a civil project. It will intensify the arms race in all spheres and escalate it to a still higher qualitative and quantitative level. Those who want more arms are mad. The earth is larded with weapons of mass destruction, and now the same fate is being reserved for outer space. People's chances of survival are diminishing from day to day. SDI is an extremely dangerous project.

What is the membership of your party, and how do you rate its chances of success in the coming political struggle in the F.R.G.?

We have three thousand representatives elected to many municipalities,

most state parliaments, the Bundestag, and also to the European Parliament. Our party has won from 6 to 8 per cent of the vote, even up to 15 per cent in some cities. In 1985 we lost the elections in Saarland and North Rhine-Westphalia, but our showing in the recent municipal elections was quite good—7.6 to 8 per cent, on average. The outlook for the January 1987 elections in Bavaria, Lower Saxony and Bonn is bright. Over the seven years of our party's existence its membership has grown to an impressive 40,000. The strength of the Green Party lies not only in its size but also in the fact that we keep coming up with new ideas, spotlighting problems of vital interest to people, and submit to national discussion issues which certain circles are trying to hush up—such as protection of the environment and disarmament policy.

Are you satisfied with your representatives' activity in elected government bodies?

In parliaments, bills are enacted by a majority vote. The only state where we work in coalition with the SPD is Hesse. Together with the Social Democrats, however, we are in the majority in 30-40 cities where we have had various decisions adopted on such matters as, for example, environmental protection and restrictions on the use of atomic energy. Much has been done in the social, transport and health spheres. Our growing party sets high standards for its representatives in elected government bodies: we expect them to be not only vigorous, but also well informed. At any rate, it is safe to claim that the Greens have done very useful work—and that in a mere seven years.

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CSO: 5200/1401

SALT/START ISSUES

WHITELAW CALLS ON USSR TO PROVE ADHERENCE TO SALT II

LD031452 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1402 GMT 3 Jun 86

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister Lord Whitelaw today called on the Soviet Union to prove they were not in breach of the SALT II treaty. He said the British Government was "most anxious that the treaty should not be abrogated because it would be very unfortunate if it were".

Lord Whitelaw was speaking on ITN's "News at One" after the Soviet Ambassador Mr Zamystin had warned that the flood-gates of an uncontrolled arms race would be opened if President Reagan carried out his threat to break the agreement.

Since the president's decision was based on his belief that the Soviet Union was itself breaking the treaty, Lord Whitelaw called on the Soviets to prove their innocence.

"If the Soviet Union can prove clearly to the Americans in discussions that they are in fact fulfilling their obligations then, indeed, there would be no need for President Reagan to break the Salt II agreement in the autumn," he said.

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CSO: 5240/052

SALT/START ISSUES

SOVIET ENVOY COMMENTS ON SALT, SHEVARDNADZE VISIT

LD031338 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1255 GMT 3 Jun 86

[By political staff reporter Tom McMullan]

[Text] The Soviet ambassador, Mr Leonid Zamyatin, in London today repeated before British television cameras and journalists Soviet anger at President Reagan's threat to break the SALT 2 agreement which limits the strategic nuclear weapons held by the two super powers.

He renewed the Soviet appeal to Britain to use her influence with the U.S. to prevent President Reagan going ahead with his threat by the end of the year. New political thinking was needed, he said.

Observers noted that, despite the expressions of anger, the ambassador did not rule out a summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and listed subjects on which there might be scope for agreement.

Mr Zamyatin said at a press conference that Britain and the Soviet Union had "a very good experience of cooperation". He recalled the trilateral talks between 1977 and 1980 on the ban on nuclear tests when a number of agreements were signed. He said: "The situation in the world is so complicated and tense it requires new political approaches, new political thinking and new efforts in order to curb the arms race. We think that Great Britain has its own point of view on many international issues and problems." Britain was probably aware to a greater extent than any other country of the U.S. position on major international issues. Cooperation by the British would be very much appreciated by the international community, "whether this helped to achieve compliance with existing treaties on arms control or curbed the arms race".

The ambassador said he had discussed yesterday with Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe the possible visit to London of Soviet Foreign Minister Mr Eduard Shevardnadze. They had not fixed a date, but talked of a visit in the middle or end of July.

He denied the Soviet Union had breached the provisions of the SALT 2 agreement. If the Americans breached the agreement, the Soviet Union would consider herself free from obligations and would not allow the undermining of military strategic parity. "The USSR will provide reliable security to socialist states," he said.

At any summit between Mr Gorbachev and President Reagan there should be measures which would strengthen international security and lead to a curb on the arms race. The ambassador indicated that a summit need not be confined only to nuclear issues. He said:

"We would put forward major proposals concerning the reduction of conventional weapons and forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. These proposals would be detailed and comprehensive. If we could agree on these questions, that would be a very good beginning for the summit.

"We do not see the second summit with the U.S. President as a forum where we can agree on all the problems. There is a possibility of agreeing on a ban on nuclear tests. We can agree on chemical weapons. We can agree on confidence-building measures. We can easily agree on the question of intermediate nuclear missiles."

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CSO: 5240/052

SALT/START ISSUES

THATCHER ACCUSED OF BOWING TO REAGAN ON SALT XI

LD031612 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1525 GMT 3 Jun 86

[Text] The prime minister today backed President Reagan in urging Russia to observe the threatened SALT 2 nuclear arms limitation treaty.

"I hope SALT 2 will continue to be observed on both sides," she told MPs as she faced repeated Labour demands to oppose the President's threat to drop the treaty — following claims of Soviet violation of the agreement.

Deputy Labour Leader Mr Roy Hattersley accused Mrs Thatcher, at Commons question time of "regularly humiliating yourself and the country by always dancing to President Reagan's tune."

But Mrs Thatcher called for observance by both superpowers, in line with America's stance in dismantling two Poseidon nuclear submarines.

The United States had "left the door open for the Soviet Union to comply with SALT 2 — I hope it will," she said. "There is a clear opportunity for the Soviet Union to respond positively."

Mr Hattersley had echoed the Soviet's call to exert pressure on President Reagan not to abandon SALT 2, and "jeopardise the prospects of an autumn summit." He claimed Mrs Thatcher was refusing to give "a straight answer to a straight question." And with world peace at stake she had a "duty to speak for this country rather than waiting to be told what to say by President Reagan."

The prime minister immediately dismissed his comments as "utter nonsense." She told MPs, "We regard it as important that the SALT 2 agreement should continue to be observed, and observed by both sides." She stressed that President Reagan had coupled his warning, that the U.S. might be prepared to abandon the treaty, with action in compliance with the agreement by scrapping two nuclear submarines. And she countered Mr Hattersley's attack, saying he was "never, never, never" prepared to comment on the Soviet's record.

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CSO: 5240/052

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET PROPOSAL IN CD ON BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 18, 12 May 86 p 12

[Article by D. Pogorzelsky]

[Text]

It seemed forty years ago that the nuclear bomb had made chemical weapons at once senseless and superfluous, and that they would disappear of their own accord. This was, however, only an illusion. Far from disappearing, the "silent killers" have multiplied, and Western countries, in particular the U.S., have repeatedly used them.

Today chemical weapons are among the most dangerous and barbarous means of mass destruction. Until they are eliminated mankind will be in danger of a calamity of inconceivable proportions. Just a fraction of the chemical weapons stockpiled to date is enough to turn our earth into a lifeless desert.

How is this danger to be removed?

The Soviet Union has long and persistently been suggesting ways and means of solving this crucial problem. In 1982 it worked out Basic Provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, thus providing the groundwork for getting the discussions on the issue, which had been deadlocked for years, off the ground. Nevertheless, our Western partners at the negotiations, led by the U.S., have never responded to the Soviet initiative on the pretext of it being "difficult" to exercise control.

In the Soviet view, this problem does not exist. In his January 15 statement Mikhail Gorbachev stressed in particular the need to deliver the planet from chemical weapons by the end of the century under strict international control.

Moscow has gone a long way towards making this a reality. It has announced that it is prepared to indicate the exact locations of chemical-weapon plants, discontinue production and start elaborating the procedures involved in liquidating chemical-weapon manufacturing facilities. If the appropriate convention comes into force, we shall be ready to get down to the elimination of chemical-weapon stockpiles as such.

This is exactly what our country's latest initiative in this field is aimed at. Mikhail Gorbachev put it forward at the SUPG Congress in Berlin. An appropriate document has been submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Let us dwell on the Soviet proposals in more detail.

Imagine that the convention comes into force. The moment it happens, the participating states shall stop all activity at chemical-weapon plants and close them down within three months. However, as early as 30 days after the convention is implemented, they are to disclose the whereabouts of private and publicly owned plants manufacturing chemical weapons, binary weapon com-

Immediately after the new Soviet initiatives had been made public, we contacted Geneva and asked Iztvefia correspondent Vladimir Kuznetsov to interview some delegates of the Disarmament Conference. Here is what they had to say.

Roberto FRANCESCHI,
head of the Italian delegation:

In the Soviet proposals I should like to single out the emphasis on a comprehensive solution to all the problems involved in the elimination of chemical weapons: the destruction of stockpiles and the plants that manufacture the weapons, and the problems of control and inspection. Specific time limits are set for the implementation of all the convention provisions, which is very important. Moreover, the Soviet proposals provide for the need to work out a procedure for closing and reorienting chemical-weapon plants. They help settle unresolved issues and pave the way for confidence among the convention signatories. They provide for an effective national and international inspection authority and make a mechanism for the elimination of chemical weapons a realistic proposition. I hope these proposals, like those of other countries, will expedite the elaboration of the convention and help carry out the plans for the elimination of chemical weapons by the beginning of the 21st century. A successful solution of the problem of chemical weapons will create a good precedent and bring the solution of other disarmament problems closer.

ponents included. Within six months all the participating states shall start eliminating their stockpiles of chemical weapons, and within a year destroy or dismantle plants that produce "silent killers." Chemical weapons are to be completely phased out in a decade, at the most.

But what about the verification and control the West is making such a fuss about? The U.S.S.R. has made all the necessary provisions in this respect. Let international inspectors themselves seal the facilities being closed off and then periodically check whether the seals have been tampered with and whether the facilities are really inactive. The Soviet Union also suggests a procedure in

accordance with which international inspectors could monitor in person the major stages in the destruction or dismantling of these facilities. When everything has been done, another international inspection could be carried out.

Consequently, the plan suggested by the U.S.S.R. is realistic and concrete. It offers new opportunities for signing the convention. We know from past experience that an agreement usually takes effect two to three years after being signed. Consequently, the convention must be worked out in full in the next year or two.

The stand taken by the United States and some of its allies is an obstacle to this. Washington is bent on launching the production of binary weapons late next year and deploying them in Western Europe, without regard for any one or anything. This will naturally lead to a new aggravation of tension in Europe, add greatly to the danger of an armed conflict, and complicate the chemical-weapons ban talks now in progress at the Geneva Conference.

K.R. NARAYANAM,
Indian Minister of State
for External Affairs:

The project for the elimination of chemical weapons must be considered along with other Soviet initiatives. These are a stage-by-stage programme for delivering the world from nuclear weapons by the end of the present century, with space strike weapons banned, the proposal for the complete elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and the recent proposal to reduce conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals. The proposal for chemical disarmament under inspection and control provides a concrete approach which the international community can and must adopt in other fields as well, particularly in nuclear disarmament. All it takes is political will and regard for the interests of people of all nations, who do not want to die either in a gas attack or a nuclear explosion.

This is why India, along with the other non-aligned countries, urges early disarmament and the implementation of the idea of peaceful co-existence among states.

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS CONFERENCE ON CW BAN

PM261617 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 May 86 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Press Conference in Moscow"]

[Text] A press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists on the problems of banning chemical weapons was held in the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center 20 May.

It was said in the statements that it is not largely a matter of solving the question of whether events will develop in the direction of the complete liquidation of chemical weapons--that barbaric means of mass destruction--or whether the world will be driven into an extremely dangerous round of the arms race as a result of U.S. "expansion of the production of a new type of such weapons--binary weapons.

The course now being followed by the United States and a number of its NATO allies in seeking the bloc's approval for the program of chemical rearmament is fraught with extremely dire consequences for European and universal security.

The implementation of U.S. plans for the production of binary weapons is directly linked by Washington with their subsequent deployment in West Europe, and this threatens to transform densely populated regions of this continent into a potential theater of destructive chemical warfare. The main casualties here would occur primarily among the civilian population, which, unlike the armed forces, is virtually defenseless in the face of this barbaric means of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union counters the course of chemical insanity with a program for chemical disarmament. It has repeatedly submitted specific and realistic proposals within the UN framework, at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and in the course of bilateral contacts with the United States--proposals which would ensure the swiftest reaching of agreement on a total, universal, and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Our main objective is to complete liquidation of chemical weapons and the actual industrial base for their manufacture, and this was said most definitely in M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January statement. In parallel with this, the USSR also

advocates the implementation of a number of interim steps along the path to radical agreement—the adoption of measures to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and to rid individual parts of the world of them.

The eradication of chemical weapons is an absolutely necessary structure in the edifice of a secure world and in the system of universal security which the Soviet Union proposes to erect through the joint efforts of all states. Chemical disarmament would be of particularly great importance for Europe—a continent where the most powerful NATO and Warsaw Pact Armed Forces groupings oppose each other.

Answers were given to journalists' questions.

It was said in reply to a question concerning the U.S.-FRG agreement on binary weapons that the main meaning of this agreement is that the FRG undertakes to support the start of binary weapons production in the United States, thus setting an example of "Atlantic discipline" to other NATO members and particularly to those who disagree with the new round of the chemical arms race. And as soon as binary weapons appear in U.S. arsenals, the inevitable next step would be their deployment in the regions for which they are destined, in other words West Europe and FRG territory in particular. The stance taken by the FRG as regards binary weapons is, unfortunately, not an isolated instance of the FRG's backing an arms buildup, and this is totally incompatible with its leaders' statements in favor of arms reductions and "the creation of a world with fewer arms."

As regards the USSR's stance on verification [kontrol] within the framework of a future convention banning chemical weapons, it was pointed out that the Soviet Union does not imagine any chemical disarmament without the strictest and most reliable verification, including international verification. It proposes establishing systematic international verification [kontrol] of the entire process of eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. The new Soviet proposals submitted at the Disarmament Conference on 22 April also envisage strict verification [kontrol], including systematic international on-site inspections [proverki], of the accuracy with which sites have been declared to be producing chemical weapons and of their closure, and the presence of international inspectors at all important operations to eliminate or dismantle such sites. The USSR proposes that the convention also stipulate flexible and at the same time effective verification [kontrol] measures in the event of the emergence of unclear situations and doubts with regard to the observance of the convention, including international on-site inspections [proverki].

It was also noted that the Soviet Union supports and highly evaluates the initiatives of the governments of the GDR and the CSSR and of Bulgaria and Romania on the creation of zones free of chemical weapons in Central Europe and the Balkans. In the event of such zones being created the Soviet Union would be prepared to guarantee and respect their status, provided, of course, that the United States, for its part, acted in a similar fashion.

in connection with the question of the special danger of binary chemical means in comparison with "conventional" chemical arms it was made clear that the different sets of components in binary systems make it possible to vary their strike characteristics and complicate the detection of a chemical attack and the defense of troops and the civilian population from such an attack. The possibility is emerging that these munitions could be produced secretly and sited and replenished with a view to a surprise attack. The danger that chemical weapons might spread throughout the planet is intensifying. That is why the claims by the initiators of the creation of the new generation of chemical weapons that binary arms are somehow "safe" are thoroughly groundless.

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CSO: 5200/1415

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

UK GOVERNMENT ENDORSES REINTRODUCTION OF BINARY WEAPONS

LD221848 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1806 GMT 22 May 86

[By Geoff Meade, staff reporter in Brussels]

[Excerpts] Britain tonight fully backed the USA's plans for a new generation of chemical weapons — but warned that the prime minister would hold the ultimate veto on their wartime deployment in the UK.

Defence Secretary Mr George Younger said there was no existing British facilities to house supplies of the latest controversial weapons, and no official approaches had been made by Washington for the UK to act as a base in the event of crisis. Mr Younger, speaking after the NATO allies approved US plans for its first production of such weapons in 17 years, said: "We have had no discussions or approaches from the US on the matter of deployment — no requests to store, deploy or position these weapons in Britain.

"If there was any request for the stationing of these weapons, either in peace or war, they would have to come to me, and I would have to consult my colleagues. The prime minister would have the veto. But we do not envisage any stationing of these weapons in Britain in peacetime."

Mr Younger said the "overwhelming" endorsement of the USA request to NATO for approval was a clear signal of support to the US Congress.

Britain has had no chemical weapons since the 1950s, and the question of the deployment of the USA's new brand of such devices in the UK would be bound to cause a major controversy.

Mr Younger hinted tonight that acceptance of the weapons on British soil — in wartime — would be a natural progression from approval of Washington's plans to build them.

"If there was a state of hostilities and the NATO countries were threatened with the use of chemical weapons by the Soviet Union, I think most of the NATO countries would be very glad to have the availability of some response which would prevent the Soviet Union from using them," said Mr Younger.

But he emphasised that the ultimate goal of all NATO nations — and the Americans — was the worldwide ban on the existence of such weapons.

He said Britain had had none since the 1950s, but the Soviet Union had not paid "a blind bit" of attention to that fact.

Mr Younger said he hoped that the USA's decision to proceed with a new generation of chemical weapons would persuade Russia to consider taking part in a total ban.

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CSO: 5240/054

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: BONN CSCE INTERPARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

Speakers Cited

LD271518 Moscow TASS in English 1336 GMT 27 May 86

[Text] Bonn, 27 May (TASS)--No task is more important to Europe now than withdrawal of nuclear weapons and other types of lethal weapons, including chemical ones, from Europe's territory.

A specific and real way towards resolving that problem is shown by the fresh Soviet peace initiatives put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. This is the keynote of most of the speeches at the current sixth inter-parliamentary conference in the FRG capital on cooperation and security in Europe.

Attending the conference is a Soviet delegation headed by Lev Tolkunov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Group.

A high appreciation of the USSR's large-scale program directed at ridding mankind of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 was given, in particular, by Jan Marko, deputy chairman of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly. He criticized the unconstructive stand of Washington, which rejected the Soviet initiative. Jan Marko pointed out the importance also of other Soviet proposals which provide for a cut in conventional weapons and forces, a ban on chemical weapons.

A number of speakers condemned the propaganda campaign launched in the West over the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. This campaign, said Herbert Fehner, chairman of the GDR inter-parliamentary group, is used by certain circles to set up additional obstacles in the way of East-West relations, pursue the aim of distracting Europe and the whole world from resolving the most urgent task--that of nuclear disarmament.

Disarmament Stressed

LD312028 Moscow TASS in English 2026 GMT 31 May 86

[Text] Bonn, 31 May (TASS)--TASS correspondent Gennadiy Kulbitskiy reports:

The 6th Interparliamentary Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe closed here today. It demonstrated the parliamentarians' desire for continued European process initiated in Helsinki and for a search for ways to end the arms race.

The conference was attended by delegations from 29 countries, including a Soviet delegation led by Lev Tolkunov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the Soviet Parliamentary Group.

Keen debates on the contribution of the parliaments of the countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to the further extension of world detente and to the achievement of true progress towards disarmament continued in the building of the West German Bundestag during six days. However, some speakers attempted to substitute other subjects for substantive problems and took the liberty of attacking the Soviet Union.

By and large, these obstructionist actions were not successful. The documents approved by the interparliamentary conference voice serious worry over the unprecedented escalation of the arms race, the continued accumulation and deployment of weapons in Europe, and the threat of the extension of the arms race into outer space. They demand that the year 1986, International Year of Peace, be marked by radical progress towards ending the arms race.

The participants in the conference, the principal document points out, voice support for all the fresh efforts to make detente a continuous, increasingly viable and all-embracing process of world-wide scope, precisely as was decided by the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, who signed the Helsinki Final Act. The document notes that the Soviet-American summit in Geneva last November gave the hope of the possible relaxation of international tension. The participants in the interparliamentary conference attached much importance to the provision formulated in the Soviet-American joint statement that nuclear war must never be fought and that the USA and the USSR recognized the importance of the prevention of any war, nuclear or conventional, between them and would not seek military superiority.

The participants in the conference expressed the hope for the success of the ongoing Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and also that the Vienna meeting of the countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would make a constructive contribution to the process initiated in Helsinki.

The conference passed a resolution urging the parliaments and governments to take steps aimed at lessening tension and strengthening stability, security and peace in the Mediterranean, a region the security of which is closely linked to that of Europe and the world as a whole.

'Lively Exchange'

PM040835 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Jun 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Ye. Grishin Dispatch: "Strengthening the Edifice of Detente"]

[Text] Bonn -- The Sixth Interparliamentary Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe [CSCE], in which delegations from the parliamentary groups of 29 countries participated, has finished work in the capital on the Rhine. The Soviet delegation, headed by L.N. Tolkunov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union and chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Group, was comprised of USSR Supreme Soviet Deputies V.T. Stepanov, V.S. Makarenko, T.N. Bokareva, and A.V. Koop.

For 6 days in the Bundestag there was a lively exchange of opinions on what contributions could be made by parliamentarians to strengthening universal detente and further implement the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Despite differences in political convictions the speeches of the overwhelming majority of the delegates mentioned the absolute need to prevent a war -- nuclear or conventional -- and revive the spirit of detente. The conclusion that 1986 -- International Year of Peace -- has been marked by a radical shift in the implementation of a comprehensive disarmament program was equally unanimous.

In the concluding resolution the conference participants called on governments and parliaments to do everything possible to curb the arms race, and nuclear tests, and prevent the militarization of space. The document expresses the hope that the current Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe will soon end with the adoption of a meaningful final document that will be presented to the Vienna conference. The parliamentarians advocated that the forthcoming Vienna meeting of representatives of the countries participating in the CSCE would be held at foreign minister level. This would demonstrate its importance for further developing the detente process.

The interparliamentary forum stressed the need to urgently eliminate seats of tension in the world. In this connection the conference participants consider it important to take positive steps aimed at strengthening stability in the Mediterranean -- a region whose security is closely linked with European and world security as a whole. To that end it is necessary to eradicate the causes of tension that have emerged as a result of the Israeli occupation of Arab lands and the interventionist U.S. intrigues against Libya.

Examining the questions of cooperation in the sphere of economics, science, technology, and the environment, the parliamentarians resolutely condemned all forms of protectionist, discriminatory, and restrictive practices in trade among the countries. They stated their conviction that the existing reduction in military spending and the removal of the threat of war would promote the resolution of global socioeconomic problems. The conference welcomed the resumption of dialogue between the CEMA and the EEC, believing that the establishment of official relations between these two organizations would be mutually advantageous and would lead to an expansion of European cooperation.

The forum participants discussed ways of improving nuclear power safety by expanding international cooperation and strengthening the IAEA's role. They advocated the convening of a conference on the questions of nuclear safety with a view to drawing up international agreements on exchanging information on AES accidents and providing aid in emergencies.

The interparliamentary conference, which has now been held for the sixth time, demonstrated parliamentarians' desire to make new efforts to make detente an effective, viable, and all-embracing process in international relations. The unanimous opinion was expressed that the Helsinki Final Act is a unique multilateral instrument for ensuring security and cooperation in Europe and worldwide.

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR CRITICIZES U.S., NORTH EUROPE OPPOSITION TO NFZ

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENiya in Russian No 3, Mar 86 (signed to press 12 Feb 86) pp 73-75

[Article by S. Morgachev: "On the Paths Toward a Nuclear-Free Northern Europe"]

[Text]

I

The first conference of members of parliament of North European countries on questions of the creation in the region of a zone free of nuclear weapons was held in November 1985 in Copenhagen. The heads of government of Finland and Sweden, K. Sorsa and O. Palme, A. Jorgensen, leader of Denmark's Social Democratic Party, G.H. Brundtland, chairman of Norway's Labor Party, other officials and politicians took part.

As is known, the idea of the creation of such a zone was advanced in 1963 by Finnish President U.K. Kekkonen. It took approximately 20 years for the debate which had arisen in connection with it to move on to the practical plane to a certain extent. In 1981 this question was incorporated for the first time on the official agenda of a meeting of foreign ministers of the northern countries. In 1981 and 1983 the Swedish and Danish parliaments passed resolutions making it incumbent upon their governments to act in the interests of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the region. A regional parliamentary conference on this problem was now finally a possibility.

The efforts which are being made are assuming an increasingly intensive and meaningful character. They are supported by the overwhelming majority of the population and the antiwar and many other public organizations of the northern countries and are based on such a firm foundation as the absence on their territory of nuclear weapons. However, the policy of Norway, Denmark and Iceland does not preclude but essentially presupposes the appearance in these countries of such weapons in a "crisis situation," which cannot fail to have a far-reaching impact on the actual situation in the region. In other words, North Europe's present actual nuclear-free status is relative. It is a question of consolidating it. How?

The natural and effective solution could be the enshrinement of the region's nuclear-free status on a permanent international-law basis. This would contribute to the increased level of stability, security and trust in the European North and also be of positive significance in a broader plane. At

the present time the main political forces of the North European countries declare their, in principle, positive attitude toward U.K. Kekkonen's idea. It is also supported by the Soviet Union, as a nuclear power which is a potential guarantor of the nuclear-free zone. Thus a quite strong base for further efforts in this direction has taken shape.

But there are still many obstacles, and the most important of these is the negative, obstructionist position of the United States and the NATO leadership. Washington and Brussels (the bloc's headquarters) are unequivocally opposed to the very idea and are using all opportunities for pressure on the northern countries. And, furthermore, certain high-ranking persons like, for example, U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary R. Perle and B. Rogers, commander of NATO armed forces in Europe, have made it the rule to express themselves on this issue in a high-handed and slighting manner, demonstrating disrespect for the cherished hopes and aspirations of millions of North Europeans. At the same time, however, considering the popularity of the idea, U.S. ruling circles are resorting to political maneuvering. Washington is hinting that in the distant future, at a certain stage of a general improvement in East-West relations and given achievement of the appropriate accords in the military sphere, its attitude toward the idea could change.

II

As is known, the North European countries adhere to noncoincident foreign policy courses. Thus Norway, Denmark and Iceland are members of NATO, Sweden pursues a policy of neutrality, "free of alliances," and Finland's foreign policy line is based on the 1948 Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty with the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, the North European countries act to a certain extent and on certain questions as a kind of political community inasmuch as the international position of each of them is closely interconnected with the position of the others. Such is the actual political structure which has evolved here under whose conditions the positions of the region's states on specific questions of international politics, including the problem of the creation in North Europe of a nuclear-free zone, are formed.

Experiencing stiff pressure on the part of the United States and NATO, Oslo, Copenhagen and Reykjavik base their policy in respect of a nuclear-free zone on the proposition concerning the linkage of a treaty on its creation with progress in the business of limitation of nuclear arms on the continent and the formation in Europe of a fundamentally different political atmosphere. Whence the wording: "viewing the creation of a nuclear-free zone in North Europe in a broad European interconnection," which figures so frequently in the statements of officials and also social democratic leaders. It is implied that the corresponding agreements may be reached only as part or as a consequence of broader East-West military-political accords.

As far as the position of Helsinki and Stockholm is concerned, it is believed there that the impossibility, in view of the known policy of the NATO countries, of embarking directly on realization of the idea of a nuclear-free North by no means removes preparatory activity from the agenda. An intelligent and promising

sphere thereof is considered coordination of the views of the northern countries themselves, proceeding in principle from the fact that Norway, Denmark and Iceland are not only NATO members but also belong to the political community which has taken shape in North Europe and which is based, if not on allied ties, on the interlinked character of political destiny. Any paths of such coordination, as far as the appropriate negotiations, are deemed acceptable in the capitals of Finland and Sweden.

Official representatives of Norway, Denmark and Iceland, where bourgeois governments are in office, do not spurn discussion of this question among a number of others, at the highest level included, but reject the possibility of such a discussion being accorded the status of negotiations and a mandate for the formulation of specific accords. Clearly, there is a manifest contradiction between the genuine national security interests of the North European NATO members and their governments' approach to the question of "bloc discipline" precluding for the northern countries the possibility of their own political character. Thus Danish Prime Minister P. Schlouter believes that "we (Danes--S.M.) may debate and analyze the possibilities of the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Europe and a mass of other absorbing subjects only as long as we meet with complete understanding on the part of our NATO partners."

The policy of the governments of Denmark and Norway is being sharply criticized in these countries' social democratic parties. "The government's viewpoint," G.H. Brundtland, in particular, emphasizes, "bears the stamp of a static manner of thought, passiveness and lack of enterprise." The Norwegian Labor Party attaches great significance to the northern countries' joint actions in strengthening the region's nuclear-free status. The same may also be said about Denmark's Social Democratic Party. The positions of North Europe's social democratic parties were reflected in the plan for the creation of regional--intergovernmental and interparliamentary--working groups on the question of a nuclear-free zone advanced in their joint statement on the results of the conference of members of parliament in Copenhagen.

The idea of the immediate unification of efforts in this field and the formulation of a joint platform is highly popular in scholarly circles of the North European states also. It is supported by such authorities in the sphere of political sciences as J.J. Holst, S. Lodgord and M. (Seter) (Norway) and O. Apunen (Finland).

It should be mentioned that North European academic circles have been attempting to seek out new approaches to the idea of a nuclear-free North. A result of this search was the broad understanding of the creation of a nuclear-free zone not as the act of a single moment but as a process--a process of a gradual reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in international politics in the region presupposing movement away from less binding decisions to far-reaching ones. Developing this premise, many top experts--O. Apunen (Finland), J.J. Holst (Norway), A. Myrdal (Sweden) and others--are arriving at the notion that diplomatic, international-law and military measures to strengthen the region's nuclear-free status could, depending on circumstances, be implemented in highly varied forms, combinations and temporary interconnections--and not necessarily those which have been at the center of attention hitherto. This direction of thinking is present at the level of official debate also. Thus

Finnish Foreign Minister P. Vayrynen declared: "If some less binding decision (in the sphere of the international-lawenshrinement of the region's nuclear-free status--S.M.) could prepare the ground for affording guarantees which would impose in full measure certain obligations on the guarantor-states, Finland is prepared to contribute to the preparation of such a decision."

Without losing sight of the ultimate goal--the prospect of a North excluded to the maximum possible extent from nuclear politics--many realistic politicians and scholars in North Europe are paying tribute to the significance of the very process of progress in this matter, as, equally, to the importance of its discussion and the international efforts being made jointly in this direction themselves. Let us turn in this context to Swedish Prime Minister O. Palme's pronouncement: "...The efforts aimed at creating a North European nuclear-free zone are essentially a permanent process, with which we can influence the political climate of our region. In other words, these very efforts are leading to a strengthening of trust.... We northern countries have a right to attempt to make our contribution to the peaceful development of our region and a change in the political climate, which could ultimately help us emerge from the blind alley--I refer to overarmament and military confrontation--and this is our duty." Government circles of Finland and Sweden emphasize that the delay in broader all-European decisions not only does not preclude but, on the contrary, presupposes a stimulation of efforts in the business of realization of the idea of a nuclear-free North.

Of course, the process of finding the necessary outcomes is difficult inasmuch as it is a question of the interweaving of regional and global--and wrongly understood at times, what is more--interests. But the potential of the forces in the northern countries' political and social circles which actively support the idea of a nuclear-free zone and aspire to the development of the successes which have already been scored in this field is great also.

The Soviet Union welcomes the idea of the consolidation of North Europe's nuclear-free status on a permanent international-law basis and is doing everything within its power to contribute to the creation of the conditions for its realization. It has expressed a readiness to be guarantor of the nuclear-free zone. In addition, it has been emphasized repeatedly at the highest level that the Soviet Union, meeting the wishes of a number of northern countries half-way, is prepared to study the question of certain--appreciable, furthermore--measures with reference to its own territory adjoining the zone and, finally, to discuss with the parties concerned the question of nuclear-free status being imparted to the waters of the Baltic.

M.S. Gorbachev's reply to the appeal of K. Livingstone, leader of the Greater London Council, emphasizes the important place in the struggle to narrow the sphere of nuclear preparations which belongs to measures pertaining to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. Such zones are regarded by the Soviet leadership as a positive phenomenon of international life reflecting the will of ordinary people to peace, cooperation and detente. The USSR's attitude toward nuclear-free zones makes no exception for any states here, be they

participants or nonparticipants in military alliances. If this country or the other renounces acquisition of nuclear weapons and does not have such on its territory, it can count on firm and effective guarantees of the Soviet Union.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR SUPPORTS UN'S ANTI-NUCLEAR POSITIONS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 86 (signed to press 12 Feb 86) pp 40-47

[Article by Yu. Tomilin: "Results of the UN Anniversary Session and the International Year of Peace"]

[Text] Soviet diplomacy is approaching the 27th CPSU Congress armed with the directions of the party Central Committee's April (1985) Plenum. Proceeding from its decisions, the Soviet leadership displayed a number of large-scale foreign policy initiatives which contributed to ensuring that by the fall of 1985 certain glimmers of hope for an improvement in international relations had appeared on the cloud-covered international horizon. This could not have failed to have been reflected most directly in the work of the UN General Assembly 40th, anniversary, Session. It was conducted in the period of the preparations for and realization of the meeting of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan. Merely the fact that such a meeting took place testified to certain positive changes in the international situation and the atmosphere of Soviet-American relations.

In a special resolution passed on the eve of the Geneva meeting the General Assembly expressed the hope that the meeting would lend decisive impetus to the Soviet-American negotiations in order that they might "lead to the speediest achievement of effective accords on preventing an arms race exerting a negative influence on international security and also on socioeconomic development and on reducing arsenals and preventing an arms race in space and on its use for peaceful purposes."*

The UN General Assembly anniversary session culminated in the adoption of a resolution proclaiming 1986 the International Year of Peace. This decision reflects the hope of the peoples that the present year will be a turning point in the development of world events.

* UN General Assembly Resolution 40/18, 18 November 1985.

I

An anniversary is an excuse for summing up. The United Nations emerged as the result of the victory of the freedom-loving peoples over fascism and militarism. And it is perfectly natural that the very first lines of its charter proclaim the resolve of the United Nations to save future generations from the horrors of war, display tolerance and live with one another in the world as good neighbors.

Twentyfour October 1945, when the charter of the United Nations came into force, is considered the United Nations' birthday. It has stood the test of time, and the organization itself has become an important factor in the system of international relations. It has also contributed to the fact that in the past four decades mankind has succeeded in avoiding a new world war. This is the main result of the United Nations' activity, as the message of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary to the participants in the General Assembly anniversary session emphasized. At the same time, however, the message observed that the main task set in the UN Charter has yet to be resolved--guarantees of lasting peace have not been created. "The joint efforts of states and peoples," M.S. Gorbachev observed, "are needed today more than ever to ward off from mankind the threat of nuclear catastrophe."*

This problem was at the center of the attention of the session, which examined thoroughly and in detail ways of putting an end to the arms race on Earth and its prevention in space.

The session showed that the international community is experiencing serious disquiet in connection with the threat of nuclear war. The idea that states are called upon to ward off this threat jointly just as 40 years ago the United Nations were able to rise above ideological and other disagreements and conquer the common enemy was heard insistently. Attention was called particularly to the fact that the danger of a nuclear catastrophe is growing sharply now, in connection with the plans of the United States aimed at preparing for "star wars". Many delegations expressed concern that the increased technical level of arms and their automation and electronization carry the threat of events slipping beyond the control of human intelligence. "Reaction time is being abbreviated sharply," Indian Prime Minister R. Gandhi declared. "Arms control is becoming increasingly complicated. Action and counteraction are moving increasingly beyond the sphere of man's decision. The button is threatening to work of its own accord. The world is irreversibly sliding toward nuclear catastrophe."**

Key significance in easing the nuclear threat is attached to the prevention of an arms race in space. The point being that it is primarily with this sphere that the United States is linking its hopes for the achievement of military superiority and a change in the strategic balance in its favor.

* PRAVDA, 25 October 1985.

** UN General Assembly Minutes A/40/PV 48, 24 October 1985, p 136 (Russian).

Of course, as long as there are nuclear weapons at states' disposal, the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war cannot be completely ruled out. Nonetheless, under the conditions of strategic balance such a danger is comparatively less. In addition, a state of parity is a good prerequisite for a halt to the buildup of nuclear arms and a subsequent radical reduction therein. A realistic and responsible policy is designed to ensure precisely such a development of events.

Washington's so-called "strategic defense initiative" has an entirely opposite focus. Its officially declared goal is the creation of broad-based antimissile defenses. Under the conditions of the nuclear confrontation the very advancement of such a task is the equivalent of a policy of acquiring the potential for an unpunished nuclear attack or blackmail.

It is not fortuitous that under the peal of talk about the "defensive" nature of the "star wars" program the buildup of the United States' offensive potential is continuing. All its components are being given the capacity for use in the course of a first strike. Thus it is not all nuclear weapons which it wishes to make "unnecessary" and "obsolete" but only what constitutes the basis of the USSR's defense potential.

The so-called defensive weapons of "star wars" are nothing other than space-based assault weapons. Their designation would be destroying not only missiles but also satellites. Their target would be primarily the other side's surveillance satellites in order to deprive of "sight" its strategic forces of a retaliatory strike.

The surveillance and communications satellites which exist in space currently are not weapons in the proper meaning of the word. They do not "shoot" and cannot kill or destroy. Furthermore, they contribute to a certain extent to maintaining strategic stability, depriving, inter alia, the opposite side of the possibility of launching a surprise attack. For this reason it would be wrong to claim that space has already been militarized. An arms race in space would begin in the event of the placement there of attack weapons intended for destroying targets in space or from space on Earth and if arms appeared on Earth intended for destroying space-based targets. Noteworthy from this viewpoint was the statement at the session by French External Relations Minister R. Dumas: "The deployment of new types of antimissile and antisatellite weapons on Earth or in space will lead to a new arms race, which will be fraught with new destabilizing consequences."*

Each step forward in realization of the "star wars" program is inevitably leading to the undermining of the Soviet-American accords in the sphere of strategic arms limitation, primarily the ABM Treaty, which prohibits the creation, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems and components. In addition, the "star wars" program is essentially undermining the whole process of the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. The creation and deployment in space of assault weapons by one side will demand of the other restoration of the upset parity. This will inevitably lead to a quantitative increase and qualitative improvement in strategic nuclear arms and thereby dash mankind's hopes for their limitation and reduction.

* UN General Assembly Minutes A/40/PV. 10, 27 September 1985, p 66.

In the event of the militarization of space, colossal material and human resources, which are so necessary for the solution of many urgent problems confronting mankind, would be thrown additionally into the furnace of the arms race.

Yet space, which comparatively recently even was the subject of the attention merely of people with a powerful imagination, has today become a sphere of man's practical activity. It is sufficient to say that since the time of the Soviet Union's launch of an artificial Earth satellite various countries have put in space more than 3,000 automatic and manned craft. There remains not one area of fundamental scientific research whose achievements have not been used by cosmonautics, as, equally, there is no science and sphere of man's activity in general which has not experienced directly or indirectly the influence of "peaceful space". Its continued conquest promises mankind truly unlimited prospects. "Now, when new technology is making the use of space more attractive from the economic viewpoint," Finnish Foreign Minister P. Vayrynen observed in a speech at the session, "the time has come to also give thought to a more all-embracing approach to the question of the use and control of these resources."* In general, the need to prevent the transference of the arms race to space was the leitmotiv of the majority of speeches at the anniversary session. "There is now nothing more urgent than preventing the militarization of space,"** Burmese Foreign Minister U Ye Gaung, for example, declared.

The Soviet Union put forward for examination by the General Assembly a proposal concerning the main directions and principles of broad international cooperation in the exploration and use of space for peaceful purposes. It was a question in the Soviet proposals of moving forward jointly--in the fundamental and applied spheres of the conquest of near-Earth space--in order that all peoples might enjoy the fruits of this research. Such cooperation would be realized most efficiently within the framework of a world space organization. But this would be practicable if all channels of the spread of the arms race to the boundless expanse of space were reliably closed off.

As a counterweight to the sinister "star wars" plans the Soviet Union put before the international community the "star peace" concept.

The results of the voting on the resolution on prevention of an arms race in space are eloquent testimony to the path which the UN General Assembly supported. Some 151 states, with the exception of the delegates of the United States and... Grenada, voted for the resolution. The United States did not manage to persuade even its closest allies to abstain.

The resolution, the draft of which had been prepared by nonaligned countries with the active participation of the socialist states, emphasized the need for the adoption of measures to prevent an arms race in space and confirmed

* UN General Assembly Minutes A/40/PV 6, 24 November 1985, p 37.

** UN General Assembly Minutes A/40/PV 13, 17 November 1985, p 97.

that space should be used solely for peaceful purposes. The resolution proposes that the Geneva Disarmament Conference negotiate the conclusion of an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in space in all its aspects and insistently calls for intensive constructive Soviet-American negotiations aimed at the speediest achievement of an agreement on this question.

Noting that an arms race in space could create obstacles to the development of international cooperation in the peaceful conquest of space, the resolution reflects the main focus of the Soviet proposals advanced at the 40th Session. With regard for them the document incorporates a special clause on soliciting UN members' thoughts concerning the possibility of the development of international cooperation in the prevention of an arms race in space and the peaceful conquest of outer space, including the desirability of creating the appropriate mechanism.

The resolution also reflects the proposal advanced at the session by Poland concerning an investigation of the consequences of the spread of the arms race to space.

As a whole, the document corresponds to the interests of the consolidation of peace and international security, removal of the threat of nuclear war and the development of cooperation and mutual understanding between states and peoples.

Also adopted was a special resolution which contains an instruction to the UN Committee on the Use of Space for Peaceful Purposes to continue work in the international-law and technical fields with regard, in particular, for the Soviet initiative pertaining to the peaceful use of space advanced at the 40th Session.

II

Great attention was paid at the session to questions of lessening the nuclear threat, limiting the arms race and turning it back. It was a question primarily of a discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, which would make it possible to sharply decelerate and in many respects make practically impossible a qualitative refinement of these weapons and the creation and development of new types thereof.

Many delegations mentioned the great significance of the Soviet Union's unilateral suspension as of 6 August 1985 of all nuclear explosions. Concern was expressed for the United States, for its part, to join the moratorium.

On the question of banning nuclear testing the General Assembly 40th Session passed four resolutions, which reflects both differences in approaches to the solution of this question and attempts to find new opportunities for moving it from standstill.

A resolution adopted on the initiative of the socialist states contains an appeal to the Disarmament Conference for an immediate start on negotiations for the preparation without delay of a draft treaty which would effectively ban all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all states everywhere and also contain clauses acceptable to all preventing the evasion of this ban by

means of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The assembly welcomed the unilateral moratorium imposed by the USSR on all nuclear explosions as a practicable step toward achievement of the said goal. It insistently appealed to the other nuclear powers to follow the Soviet Union's example. The sense of the General Assembly decision is clear: the chance afforded by the Soviet moratorium should not be let slip.

The need for the speediest multilateral negotiations within the framework of the Disarmament Conference on the question of banning nuclear weapons tests is also stressed in a resolution adopted at the initiative of Mexico. It is not the first year that the UN General Assembly has addressed such appeals to the Disarmament Conference. However, negotiations have not begun there owing to the American veto. The United States needs tests to perfect nuclear warheads per the nuclear rearmament program. Furthermore, it has recently embarked on the development of laser weapons with a nuclear excitation, which are assigned an important place in the "star wars" plans.

A further resolution was adopted on Mexico's initiative proposing that the United States, Britain and the USSR, as depositaries of the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, space and underwater, embark on consultations with one another for the purpose of studying the possibilities of converting this treaty into an all-embracing agreement which would prohibit nuclear weapons tests in all media, including underground. The basis for such a formulation of the question is the fact that the preamble to the Moscow Treaty contains a clause emphasizing the need for the prohibition of all tests of nuclear weapons and continued negotiations to this end.

The Soviet Union, other socialist states and the nonaligned countries supported both resolutions. Only the United States, Britain and France opposed them, as, equally, the corresponding resolution of the socialist states.

The UN General Assembly 40th Session adopted a whole number of resolutions on a broad range of questions connected with preventing nuclear war, no first use of nuclear weapons (an appeal for states to follow the example of the Soviet Union and the PRC, which undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons), a freeze of nuclear arsenals, a reduction in nuclear weapons and the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons and a number of others.

Great attention at the session was paid to the problem of the complete banning and destruction of chemical weapons. It is not the first year that negotiations on this issue have been under way at the Disarmament Conference. However, they have dragged on impermissibly. Responsibility for this lies with the United States, which is insisting that upon monitoring compliance with a convention banning chemical weapons the socialist states be put in an unequal position with the Western states.

It is well known that the General Assembly resolutions are of a recommendatory nature. They do not of themselves solve the questions which are raised, but may impart to their solution the necessary impetus. The results of the voting show very eloquently the positions to which this state or group of states or the other cleaves. From this viewpoint it is highly indicative that of the 71 resolutions adopted on arms limitation questions, the United States has not supported many: on the majority of them it has either abstained or voted against.

The United States' extremely negative behavior has repeatedly put its allies in a very difficult position. In order to present before the world community their positions in a somewhat more favorable light the Western states attempted to play on so-called "abstract" resolutions, that is, unconnected with this specific arms limitation measure or the other. They evidently reasoned thus: since they cannot vote "for" drafts proposing some specific steps in the arms limitation sphere, they will at least score political points in voting for resolutions which are absolutely nonbinding.

Thus there appeared a Western draft resolution on the question of monitoring compliance with agreements in the disarmament sphere. It is well known that throughout the history of the disarmament negotiations the Western states have resorted on multiple occasions to the assistance of this "rescue" issue in order to cover up their refusal to implement disarmament measures. The dodges to which they have had recourse have been of a dual kind: it has either been asserted that monitoring implementation of the proposed disarmament measure is impossible or supervision proposals have been put forward which go far beyond the bounds of the requirements of verification of compliance with a given agreement or measure and, in the event of their being accepted, would lead to the disclosure of data connected with states' security. A resolution adopted at the suggestion of a number of Western countries at the 40th Session emphasized the need for monitoring compliance with agreements in the arms limitation sphere and recommended that the opinion of UN members on supervision questions be solicited. Evidently the calculation of the initiators of this resolution was, having divorced the problem of supervision from specific disarmament measures, to prompt the delegation of the Soviet Union to vote against it. The Western delegations could then declare that the USSR was against supervision. But the Soviet delegation voted for this resolution.

Concerning the assertions as regards the fact that the Soviet Union is against supervision, E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, declared in a speech at the anniversary meeting of the session: "This is asserted by those who are creating new arms which are fundamentally aimed at complicating supervision. We put to them the reciprocal question: are you prepared to scrap hundreds of missiles and aircraft and thousands of nuclear warheads, as we are? Answer 'yes,' and we will certainly be able to come to an agreement on supervision."

The compliance with agreements in the arms limitation sphere was chosen as another proposition on which the West attempted to play. A group of Western delegations presented a draft resolution which proposed something which was obvious and absolutely correct--compliance with arms limitation agreements. But it was served up such as to evoke associations with recent Western frauds which claimed that the Soviet Union was violating the agreements. And here the calculation was that by virtue of these associations the USSR would vote against the resolution and thereby provide a pretext for making a song about the fact that it was opposed to compliance with the agreements. But the venture failed. The Soviet delegation voted for the resolution.

While voting in recent years against documents aimed at preventing nuclear war, certain Western states have attempted to counterpose to them the concept set forth in a draft resolution entitled "Preventing War in the Nuclear Age". Speculating on the correct proposition that it is essential to prevent not only nuclear war but also any war, they have attempted to play down the scale of the nuclear threat. Simultaneously it has been proposed as a prescription for preventing war "improving mutual information about military activity," "broadening the exchange of information and opinions on military issues" and so forth. At the same time, however, the draft makes no mention of really urgent measures of a reduction in the nuclear danger--no first use of nuclear weapons, a suspension of nuclear testing, a nuclear freeze and so forth. This attempt to turn inside out the most acute problem of the present day evoked such extensive anger among the participants in the session that the coauthors of the draft deemed it best not to have it put to the vote.

III

The session paid great attention to the tasks of eliminating regional centers of tension. It was emphasized in this connection that such conflicts should be settled by peaceful means, given full and just consideration of the legitimate interests of all sides.

The session condemned acts of aggression against Nicaragua. The adoption of a resolution demanding cancellation of the trade embargo against this country was a political defeat for the United States. Central America's problems should be settled on the basis of the right of its people to self-determination and independent choice of social system without outside interference. The overwhelming majority of General Assembly participants supported such an approach.

The United Nations again condemned the aggressive policy of Israel, emphasizing that its continuation is facilitated by the so-called "strategic partnership" between Washington and Tel Aviv. The need for the convening of an international conference with the participation of all interested parties, including the PLO, for the achievement of a genuine settlement in the Near East was emphasized.

Having condemned the South African racists and those who are blocking in the Security Council the adoption of sanctions against them in accordance with the UN Charter, the General Assembly demanded liquidation of the shameful apartheid regime and the granting of independence to Namibia without any strings. Together with the majority of other UN members the Soviet Union firmly supported these decisions.

The assembly commemorated the 25th anniversary of the adoption on the initiative of the USSR of the UN Declaration on Decolonization, emphasizing the need for its full and universal compliance.

The session also examined the problem of the release of resources for purposes of creation by means of disarmament measures and assistance to the developing countries. This will be the central task at an international conference on the interconnection of disarmament and development to be held

in the summer of 1986 in Paris. The creation of a new, just international economic order, including the solution of the debt problem, which was also supported by the majority of delegations, should serve the same goals.

Resolutions were adopted at the initiative of the socialist countries on international economic security, the impermissibility of economic compulsion and a number of other subjects.

The Soviet Union is an active champion of the safeguarding of man's basic rights and liberties. For this reason it fully supported the session's decisions on condemnation of the flagrant and mass violations of these rights and liberties on the territories occupied by Israel and in Chile and El Salvador and other manifestations of apartheid and fascist and neofascist ideology. International terrorism was rejected, and, furthermore, attempts to pin the label of terrorism on national liberation movements were emphatically condemned.

Unfortunately, however, not all participants in the session and on not all issues were able to rise above political prejudice. The result of this were resolutions once again foisted on the General Assembly on the so-called "Afghan" and "Cambodian" questions. As life itself has shown, such decisions, which are devoid of political realism, are to the benefit merely of those who, waging an undeclared war against Afghanistan and supporting the Pol Pot bands on Cambodia's borders, are impeding a political settlement in the corresponding regions. Including the negotiations under way between Afghanistan and Pakistan via the personal representative of the UN secretary general.

So, a great deal of work has been done. Besides the general political debate, on this occasion there was a considerable number of supplementary meetings specially devoted to the 40th anniversary of the United Nations. Thirtyfour heads of state, 33 prime ministers, 9 vice presidents, 12 deputy premiers and more than 100 foreign ministers spoke at the session. A 146-point agenda embracing practically all the major problems of contemporary international life was examined. More than 30 resolutions and decisions were adopted.

But the significance of the session is determined, of course, not by quantitative indicators, nor even by the fact that it commemorated the UN anniversary. Having taken place at a difficult and largely decisive moment of world development, it reflected states' growing concern at the continuing arms race, which is now threatening to take in space also, the unsettled state and, in a number of cases, exacerbation of regional crises and conflicts and the intensification of the grim economic situation of many developing countries. The session confirmed that the United Nations has considerable authority as a forum playing a truly unique part of a center for the exposition of the views of practically all states and a quest for the optimum correlation between their national and common global interests and the coordination of actions for the sake of achieving jointly set goals, the most important of which is "sparing future generations the calamities of war".

Set at the time of the birth of the organization as a result of the victory of the peoples over fascism, this great goal remains the most important for all mankind and continues to bring states together, despite the political and ideological views and approaches--sometimes opposite--which divide them. The United Nations' importance in promoting a revival of detente and in the system of reliable general security and the rule of law to whose creation the given process should lead was confirmed once again.

The anniversary session showed that, relying on the concept of peaceful coexistence and cooperation which was made the basis of the United Nations, the organization's members (and there are now 159 of them) are capable of finding--albeit not in all things--a common language and jointly formulating both high moral criteria and specific recommendations contributing to the formation of a new global political thinking corresponding to the realities of the nuclear-space age.

The peaceable countries and all who are prepared to take into consideration in their policy the will of the world community are confronted with the task of striving for the introduction in international relations of the goals and principles of the United Nations, as, equally, the decisions of the 40th Session of its General Assembly corresponding to them. The measures of the International Year of Peace must be used to the maximum in the furtherance of these noble aims.

It is significant that at the very outset of 1986 the Soviet Union has put forward a set of new large-scale foreign policy initiatives. Their purpose is to contribute to the maximum extent to an improvement in the international situation. They have been dictated by the need to overcome the negative, confrontational trends, which have grown in recent years, and to clear the way to a winding down of the nuclear arms race on Earth and its prevention in space, to a general lessening of the military danger and to the molding of trust as an inalienable component of relations between states.

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USSR COMMENTATOR BYKOV ON WORLD SECURITY, ARMS TALKS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3 Mar 86
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[Article by O. Bykov: "General Security Is An Imperative Of The Times"]

[Text] The international relations of our time are diverse, complex, and contradictory. This is a reflection of the realities of contemporary world development. The foreign policy courses of the widest range of states belonging to different social systems conflict and interact in the international arena. Bilateral relations are interwoven with multilateral ones. Rivalry, competition, and cooperation are characteristic of the political, economic, and other spheres. But for all the acuteness of international life, a problem in which the vital interests of all states are focused has advanced into the foreground, namely, the problem of international security and, in essence, the question of mankind's survival in the nuclear age.

In recent years, the scale and intensity of military confrontation has risen sharply by the fault of the aggressive forces of militarism, primarily U.S. militarism. The confrontation has led to critical tension and to the undermining of mutual confidence. The accelerating rates of the arms race have entered a stage fraught with the irreversable destabilization of the strategic situation, particularly if weapons are placed in space. Arms limitation agreements have been blocked. The old hotbeds of explosive conflicts continue to exist and new ones have appeared in various regions of the globe.

The intensification of the threat of war has made it an absolute priority of world politics to ensure international security. What is involved is no longer simply the pressing need for individual measures to restrain the dangerous course of events, but broad countermeasures aimed at a radical change for an improvement in the entire world situation. The imperative of the times is now a qualitative shift in international affairs toward ensuring a truly all-embracing, genuinely general security which requires the combined efforts of all states and people for the sake of preventing the death of world civilization and even of life itself on our planet.

The growing interdependence of peoples' interests in various spheres of constructive activity and also stable and peaceful relations between all states are an indispensable condition for the maximum utilization of the boundless potential for developing mutually advantageous international cooperation for the good of

the people. This potential is opened up by the scientific--technological revolution, from the widening of trade-economic, scientific-technological, cultural, and other ties to the joint solution of urgent global problems.

Reliable security for all is both possible and realistic, because the intensification of the threat of war is overshadowed by the rise in the interdependence of the interests of survival and cooperation. It is necessary to have a profound awareness of the realities of the nuclear and space age and a readiness to act in a constructive spirit for the sake of the preservation of peace and the progressive development of mankind.

I

One of the most difficult things in politics is to escape from the vicious circle of "action and counteraction." In order to overcome the inertia of confrontation and to cut through the tight knot which it has tied, it is necessary to display the highest degree of state wisdom and a capability for unorthodox interpretation of security problems.

It is also important to hold fast to a course of positive new impulses in the development of the international situation. The responsibility for the fate of peace requires us to rise above discord and calls for joint efforts to resolve the primary task for all people of our time--the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war.

It was to adopt precisely this approach to the burning issue of international security that the Soviet leadership was empowered by the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which stressed the need for the activation of everything possible in the USSR's peace-loving policy on the broadest front of international relations. The plenum called for every effort to be made in order that the forces of militarism and aggression not prevail; pointed out the urgency of halting the arms race and moving toward real disarmament; and came out in favor of developing smooth, correct, and civilized relations between states and of expanding and deepening mutually advantageous economic ties. The foreign policy aims of the April Plenum were embodied in the Soviet Union's large-scale concrete peace initiatives, which exerted a favorable influence on the political climate in the world and largely prepared the ground for a most important event--the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva.

Washington's approach was different. From the beginning of the eighties, the U.S. Administration adopted a course of confrontation, of upsetting strategic parity, and of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and a dominant position in the world. However, this bellicose course inevitably came into conflict with the realities of the contemporary world. Pressure met with a firm rebuff from the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. The rejection of Washington's policy increased all over the world, including among its allies. The struggle around foreign policy questions intensified within U.S. ruling circles themselves. As a result, a certain reassessment of a number of obsolete postulates of U.S. policy began--although in an inconsistent and contradictory way--and some changes began to show. In Washington, certain signs of comprehension of the need for interaction by the sides appeared, a need conditioned by the objective community of interests in the face of the threat of mutual destruction.

The meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Reagan in Geneva from 19 to 21 November 1985 was necessary, timely, and useful. After long years of dangerous confrontation, hope for a turn for the better in the world situation appeared and the way opened to the normalization of Soviet-American relations and for a constructive search for mutually acceptable solutions to controversial international questions.

The very fact that there was a meeting between the supreme leaders of two states possessing the largest military, economic, and scientific-technological potential as well as great political weight had a stabilizing effect on the state of affairs in the world. But the results of the Geneva meeting have a much broader, more principled significance with regard to strengthening international security. The mutual understanding on the cardinal issues of world politics that was achieved at the summit level and fixed in the joint statement laid the foundations for a subsequent Soviet-American dialogue. The leaders of both states declared that nuclear war must never be unleashed and that there can be no victor in such a war. They stressed the importance of preventing any war between the USSR and the United States, nuclear or conventional, and assumed the obligation not to strive for military superiority. The most important starting points have thus been determined for the joint development of concrete accords in the sphere of international security.

The significance of the central point of agreement that became clear in Geneva is difficult to overestimate: It has been determined at the most authoritative level that the historical argument between states with different social systems cannot be solved by military means.

Mutual understanding of the fundamental fact of our time was reached, the fact that the use of weapons of monstrous destructive power cannot serve any rational political goals. The sides agreed that there are no contradictions that would fatally doom the USSR and the United States to confrontation or war.

It would, of course, be unjustified to draw a conclusion from this about the possibility of placing Soviet-American relations in some peaceful, idyllic state. The differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the United States cannot disappear. It is only important that they remain within the framework of peaceful coexistence and do not create the danger of a head-on conflict, with all its catastrophic consequences for both states and all mankind.

Speaking at the press conference in Geneva after ending his talks with U.S. President R. Reagan, M.S. Gorbachev noted that: "Characteristic of the present international situation is a very important feature that both we and the United States must take into account in our foreign policy. This is what I have in mind. In the present conditions what is involved is no longer just the opposition of two social systems, but also the choice between survival or mutual destruction."

The harsh alternative has been put forth by the entire course of world development, which also dictates the only sensible choice--that in favor of survival. This is reflected in the main result of the Geneva meeting. For all the divergencies in their policies, the sides found common ground in their approach

to the central problem--that of war and peace--and this can and must serve as the starting point for improving Soviet-American relations and the entire world situation.

It is quite clear that this alone is insufficient, not only because the understanding reached in Geneva still has to be embodied in concrete accords, but also because, although the problem of ensuring general security forms the heart of Soviet-American relations, it is far from confined to these two states. In contemporary conditions its solution requires efforts by many states. It is from this that the Soviet Union and other socialist states proceed in actively participating in the process of strengthening general security on a multilateral basis and in interacting with the most diverse capitalist and developing states.

Nevertheless, the main link in the global security structure continues to be the mutual security of the USSR and the United States. This is natural. The mutual relations of the Soviet Union and the United States continue to occupy a special place in the system of contemporary international relations. On their state of relations largely depend the correlation of stabilizing and destabilizing tendencies in the world situation, primarily in the strategic respect, and in the final analysis the very possibility of preventing nuclear war. The strategic parity that has formed between the USSR and the United States is the central component in the balance of forces between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic alliance and is its main support.

Military-strategic balance is a powerful factor of general security that objectively contributes to maintaining international stability. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the relaxation of international tension and the conclusion of arms limitation agreements would have become possible at one time without such a balance. And how much is the risk of the outbreak of war as a result of the confrontation unleashed by militarist circles for that purpose, a risk that was enormous in any case would have grown had it not been for the restraining framework of strategic parity and general equality of each countries' Armed Forces!

For all the differences in the components of the sides' strategic potential, the balance that has been established between them is fairly stable. It is conditioned by the presence on both sides of the economic and scientific-technical resources necessary to prevent one of them from achieving superiority over the other. No one can gain the upper hand in military competition. It is necessary to become accustomed to an approximate equality of forces as a natural state. It stands to reason that aggressive imperialist circles do not at all want to become reconciled to the reality of military-strategic parity and are ready to continue the arms race infinitely with the goal of acquiring a decisive superiority for the United States and NATO. These aspirations are hopeless, but they are dangerous in that they carry an implicit threat that strategic stability will be shaken and international security undermined.

At the same time, equality of forces makes for a predisposition for adventurist, militarist schemes in the policy and strategy of bourgeois states, primarily the United States, to be driven back by sober, realistic calculations, or at least by elementary considerations of self-preservation. Life makes it necessary to assess the interests of one's own security in a new way, not to place them in

opposition to the interests of other's security but, on the contrary, to place them in the context of general security. The reorientation of political thinking and strategic planning in the West to new ways is proceeding with difficulty. The stereotypes of the past that have taken root hinder this. But it is necessary to reorient oneself if one is thinking seriously about security and not giving oneself up to unrealistic thoughts of hegemony.

The mutual obligation of the Soviet Union and the United States not to strive for military superiority strengthens their security in equal measure. On the other hand, attempts to alter the strategic balance in one's favor would stimulate further military rivalry, and in the final analysis both sides would end up with less security. The Soviet leadership is deeply convinced that less security for the United States compared with the Soviet Union—even if this were feasible in practice—would be disadvantageous to the Soviet side, as it would lead to distrust and give rise to instability.

Mechanistic "counterweight" schemes are inapplicable to the sphere of international security. In our time the concept of this sphere must be constructed not on the interests in preventing a general catastrophe—nuclear war. In this sense, the more reliable the mutual security of the USSR and the United States—naturally, without harming the interests of third countries—the higher the level of global international security. In turn, a great degree of security in the relations of third countries or in individual regions is to the good of both Soviet-American relations and international relations as a whole. Thus, as a result of the positive interaction of many states, a new type of international security is appearing and developing that is engendered by the demands of the preservation and the progress of world civilization.

Equality in the sphere of security, as in the strategic sphere, is far from being a simple arithmetical equation. It is not only characterized by the quantity and quality of weapons or even by more general indices of military might; it also has very important nonmilitary parameters—socioeconomic, scientific-technical, geographic, diplomatic, psychological, and others. Moreover, nonmilitary aspects acquire increasing importance in conditions of a stable balance. Parity contributes to turning security from a primarily military category into a primarily political one. Equality and reciprocity move the problem of security from a narrow confining framework into a broad field of political cooperation between states in the interests of a fundamental improvement in the world situation.

Of course, the balance of military forces cannot be accepted as an ideal condition for the development of international relations, particularly if it is maintained at the present high level.

But it is not the final result, merely the necessary starting point for advancing toward mutual security on the broadest front.

It is precisely toward this end that the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the Soviet Government on a number of large, new USSR foreign policy actions of a principled nature are directed. In his statement of 15 January 1986, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed that these decisions are expected to greatly promote an improvement of the international situation; to overcome the negative confrontational trends that

have grown in recent years; and to clear the way toward curtailing the arms race on earth, preventing it in space, generally reducing the danger of war, and building confidence as an inseparable component in the relations between states.

II

The general trend toward strengthening international security is beginning to gather force, but it is being stubbornly resisted by militarist circles, which are continuing to rely on force in their policy and are whipping up the arms race.

It is necessary for there to be joint understanding of the fact that a considerably smaller amount of weapons than now possessed by the sides is adequate for purely defensive goals. A radical reduction in the arms level on the basis of equality and reciprocity will not only not weaken, but, on the contrary, will substantially strengthen the security of both the USSR and the United States, will stabilize the world strategic situation, and will clear the way toward disarmament--the pivot of international security.

Of principled importance was the accord reached by the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva in January 1985. This accord dealt with negotiations that cover the entire complex of space-based and nuclear weapons and have as their goal the prevention of the arms race in space and its halting on earth.

Prior to the Soviet-American summit meeting, the USSR advanced a series of proposals designed to shift the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons that were at a standstill. Carefully developed in strict accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, they provided for the achievement of an accord between the USSR and the United States on a total mutual ban on space-based weapons and on a truly radical 50 percent cut in nuclear weapons that reach each other's territory. The USSR also proposed that medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe be cut. This was to be done through the conclusion of an intermediate agreement separately, not in direct connection with the problem of space-based and strategic weapons.

In the interests of creating a favorable atmosphere for negotiations, the Soviet Union undertook a number of important steps: It unilaterally halted all nuclear tests, expressing a readiness to rapidly renew negotiations on a total nuclear ban; it announced a moratorium on the siting of its medium-range missiles in the European zone and took out of combat readiness that quantity that had been deployed [razvernuty] in response to the installation [ustanovka] of U.S. medium-range weapons in Western Europe; it confirmed its unilateral moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite weapons; it proposed that, on condition that the arms race be prevented in space, widescale international cooperation be developed in researching and utilizing space for peaceful purposes.

A number of Soviet initiatives aimed at arms limitation and reduction did not go unanswered. It is true that many points in the counterproposals advanced by the United States essentially repeated everything that for a number of years had created an obstacle in the path of agreement.

First and foremost, they continue to contain unacceptable provisions that ignore the differences in structure of the opposing forces and which are aimed at a substantial cutback in the main component of Soviet strategic power--ICBM's--with a smaller reduction in the basic strike weapons of the U.S. strike potential--submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, including those with cruise missiles on board.

At the same time, the U.S. position on certain issues were contiguous to the Soviet ones; to be specific, both sides agreed to proceed from the fact that as a result of a 50 percent reduction in carriers, each would have the same number of nuclear warheads--6,000 units each--which would ensure that the strategic balance was maintained but at a radically reduced level.

The question of halting the arms race was the basic one in the negotiations of M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Geneva. However, it was not possible to find a resolution to it at the meeting. The American leadership's unwillingness to abandon its "star wars" program did not allow concrete accords to be reached.

In developing its program of preparations for the siting of space-strike weapons, the U.S. Administration is passing it off as "defense measures" which is supposedly aimed at strengthening international security through stabilization of the strategic situation and, in the final analysis, at getting rid of nuclear weapons altogether. In other words, the anti-missile "shield," which is outwardly attractive to the inexperienced, is to devalue the nuclear "sword".

But the advertisement for the "Strategic Defense Initiative" does not conform to reality. The creation of space-based weapons is not at all of a defensive nature. It is integrated into the general complex of U.S. military preparations aimed at acquiring the capability of inflicting a disarming first strike. The development [razrabotka] and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of space-based systems are intended to ensure an unpunished attack on the USSR using offensive nuclear weapons under cover of these systems. Moreover, space-based weapons themselves are also weapons (of a qualitatively new type) capable of destroying not only missiles in flight, but also ground targets.

It is quite clear that this kind of "defense" cannot contribute to curtailing the arms race; on the contrary, it would raise the arms race to an immeasurably higher level. What would happen would not be a simple addition of space-based weapons to nuclear ones, but a powerful acceleration of the entire interconnected process of creating offensive and defense weapons. The dynamics and qualitative characteristics of the arms race would fundamentally change. The marked intensification in the American side's aspiration to move into the lead, implementing the accelerated creation [sozdaniya] and deployment [razvertyvaniya] of nuclear and space-based weapons with the aim of achieving superiority, would inevitably call forth a timely and commensurate response, the aim of which would be to prevent the military-strategic balance from being upset. However, this would mean that the system of "action and counteraction," which is complicated in any case, would become even more complex. Uncertainty and unpredictability would rise sharply. There would be an intensified risk of fatal conflict as a result of accident, miscalculation, or faulty computer systems.

If the placing of weapons in space is not prevented, it will not be possible to rely on the strengthening of strategic stability. The destructive interaction of space-based and nuclear weapons threatens to put the strategic situation in a chaotic state. It goes without saying that the possibilities of reducing the accumulated stocks of nuclear weapons would be nullified, and indeed the entire disarmament process would run up against serious obstacles. As a result, a most serious blow would be dealt to international security.

The position of the Soviet Union is clear: Space must remain free of weapons. They must not be created. Under a mutual ban, strict control could be established, including opening corresponding laboratories for inspection [inspektsiya].

As a result of the Geneva summit meeting, the sides agreed to accelerate fulfillment of the tasks set in the joint Soviet-American statement of 8 January 1985: To prevent the arms race in space and to halt it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear weapons, and to strengthen strategic stability. This principled accord must be concretely embodied in the process of the negotiations on nuclear and space-based weapons. In spite of the substantial differences between the sides' positions, there is a real possibility of drawing them closer together if they both strive for compromises in the interest of deep cuts in strategic weapons, on condition, of course, that the arms race is not allowed to spread into space. Neither is the way closed toward an agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. It is clear that there is a considerable amount of work to be done, but the very fact that negotiations are being conducted must not serve as a justification and cover for the arms race.

III

It is not easy to move the cause of curbing the arms race from a standstill, but it is perhaps no easier to accelerate it and to strive for weighty results. It is not only the fierce resistance of the forces of militarism that will have to be overcome. Another constraint is the routine--formed under the negative influence of confrontation--of the very process of developing proposals and conducting negotiations and the fixed patterns that have taken root in this process and which long ago showed that they were unproductive and hopeless. Movement is hindered by an artificial linking of heterogeneous issues, by irrevocable rigidity to the detriment of the search for compromise solutions, by the advancement of unacceptable proposals, by the substitution of practical discussion with an aspiration to win propaganda points, and by fruitless discussions on numbers and petty trading.

At the present stage the negotiation process is essentially lagging behind the arms buildup. Only an innovative and creative approach is capable of leading to the revision of obsolete concepts and ineffectual methods. In conditions of parity, large-scale and essentially political solutions can and must be sought to the problems of arms limitation and reduction, as can ways of moving forward toward real disarmament. An example of such an approach is the wide-scale complex of new initiatives on curbing the arms race advanced by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986. These initiatives embrace the entire range of weapons--nuclear, space-based, chemical, and conventional.

At the center of the proposed measures stands the concrete program of the total liquidation of nuclear weapons all over the world, a program designed for the period up to the end of this century. The USSR and the United States should begin the consistent stage-by-stage reduction of arsenals of these weapons, with a ban on the creation [sozdaniye], testing [ispytaniye], and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of space-strike weapons. Other nuclear powers would then become involved in this process, making it possible in the final analysis to conclude nuclear disarmament everywhere by the year 2000. It is necessary to develop a universal accord so that nuclear weapons never reappear. Verification [kontrol] over destroyed and reduced weapons would be implemented by national technical means and by on-site inspection [inspektsiya na meste].

This is a constructive alternative to the U.S. program of creating [sozdaniye] a space-based, anti-missile system. If the U.S. Administration is really striving to rid the world of nuclear weapons, as it has declared, then there is a real possibility of a settlement. Instead of constructing a "shield" in space at the cost of enormous expenditures and of the undermining of strategic stability, it is more sensible to liquidate nuclear weapons.

The time has come to put an end to all nuclear explosions. Guided by the aspiration to undertake another practical step in this direction, the Soviet Union adopted a decision, within the context of the program of nuclear disarmament, to extend its unilateral moratorium on any nuclear explosions starting 1 January 1986. It was not a simple decision since the United States was continuing nuclear tests. The logic of the arms race suggested that they be resumed on the Soviet side, too. But, nevertheless, the Soviet Union proposed once again that the vicious circle of "action and counteraction" be abandoned.

There are no convincing arguments against a nuclear test ban, including what concerns the problems of control [kontrol]. Both sides have an interest in control. In conditions of mutual distrust it is no less necessary to the Soviet Union than it is to the United States. Verification of the observance of a concrete accord--whether by national technical means or international verification--cannot and must not be a stumbling block.

The USSR is decisively in favor of the moratorium on nuclear explosions becoming bilateral and then multilateral. It is also in favor of the resumption of trilateral Soviet-U.S.-British negotiations on a total and general ban on nuclear weapons tests. The Soviet Union is ready, too, for multilateral negotiations on a test ban to begin without delay within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, negotiations in which all nuclear powers would participate.

The new Soviet initiatives proceed from the need for an urgent solution to other disarmament problems and for a reduction in the level of military confrontation.

The USSR is in favor of the swift and total liquidation of such barbaric means of mass destruction as chemical weapons. It also proposes the liquidation of the very industrial base for the manufacture of these weapons and the destruction of all accumulated stocks of them under strict control [kontrol], including international on-site inspection [proverka na mestakh].

The Soviet Union proposes that as well as the removal of weapons of mass destruction from states' arsenals, conventional weapons and armed forces should become the subject of agreed reductions. This could be initiated by an accord at the Vienna negotiations, where the contours are being delineated for a possible decision on a reduction of Soviet and U.S. troops and on the subsequent freezing of the level of both armed forces in central Europe. It would be possible to establish reasonable verification [kontrol] of the observance of the agreement, including control points to observe the entry of any troop contingents into the zone of the reduction.

The USSR is ready to contribute in every way to progress at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security, and Disarmament in Europe. It has become completely feasible to create barriers in the path of the use of force and of secret preparations for war, whether on land, at sea, or in the air. The time has come to eliminate the remaining obstacles that prevent agreement, primarily on the issue of notification of exercises of ground troops, air forces, and navies. It has not been possible so far to resolve this issue as complex, and for this reason the Soviet side proposed that agreement be reached first on notification of large-scale exercises of ground troops and air forces and that the question of naval activity be postponed to the next stage of the conference.

Within the context of the principled decisions capable of exerting a powerful restraining influence on the arms race, wide possibilities open up for determining the balance of the sides' forces at as low a level as possible, with the components of these forces, which differ in quantitative and qualitative parameters, being comprehensively equalized.

There is no need at all to strive for "mirror image" reductions. Moreover, a fascination with symmetry only harms matters. The main task is to achieve a substantial reduction in the level of confrontation on the basis of general quality and total reciprocity and to move forward to disarmament. The Soviet Union is displaying goodwill here. If there is a mutual, radical decrease in the number of nuclear warheads to an equal point, it is ready for there to be a certain number of carriers in favor of the United States. Within the framework of the process of a general reduction of armed forces and weapons in central Europe, it would agree to a greater reduction in the number of its own forces as compared with the U.S. forces in the first stage. These are not unilateral concessions, but a constructive contribution to the cause of consistent curtailment of the arms race.

Neither are the unilateral steps in the same direction concessions. It is quite clear that the way toward agreement is laid by both sides. Mutuality cannot be avoided here. Even if unilateral measures do not bring about a countermovement--and the Soviet Union has to face the absence of reciprocity from the United States--even then the initiative is not in vain, because it augments the positive moral-political potential that is expected to serve as an important basis in the struggle for disarmament for the foreseeable future.

The complex of new Soviet initiatives in the beginning of 1986 contain a powerful charge of energy and purposefulness so necessary in order to put into motion the entire existing system of negotiations in the sphere of arms limitation and

reduction. To achieve a genuine "breakthrough" in this main area of international affairs is to implement a real advance toward ensuring security for all people and states.

IV

International security has global and regional levels. At the higher, global level, where the states of the two world systems oppose each other and cooperate, the central problem of preventing nuclear war is being solved. At the regional level, the interests of states in this region are interwoven with those of external forces, and the urgent question here is primarily one of overcoming conflict situations. There is naturally no clear dividing line between these two levels; they are combined in part and they interact vigorously. It stands to reason that the global level is dominant, but the regional level is far from being a simple projection of it. The central problem--war and peace--leaves the strongest mark on the development of events regionally, while regional problems, particularly those connected with international conflicts--whether of local origin or those caused by outside interference--influence the political climate all over the world to a great degree.

Regional conflicts are diverse in form, as is the contemporary world, particularly the extensive zone of developing countries. They arise as a result of conflicts between local forces, but are deepened and inflamed by the policy of imperialism. As a result, conflicts become prolonged, chronic, and not subject to settlement.

Indeed, settlement does not even enter the calculations of those imperialist circles, particularly the United States, which aims to use regional conflicts to their own advantage, these conflicts occupying an intermediate position between a large war and general peace in their minds. Furthermore, they intentionally bring conflicts to the critical limit and play with the fate of millions of people. Ideological intolerance is embodied in crude interference in the affairs of sovereign states, in the waging of undeclared wars and overt and covert subversive operations against them, in the policy of state terrorism, and in other dangerous actions by the United States. Great-power ambitions are expressed in the aspiration for hegemony in regions that have arbitrarily been declared as "zones of exclusive interests" of the United States.

The regional aspects of U.S. policy are inseparable from global ones. The general line of drawing entire regions into the world system of military-political confrontation is to be seen in both. Not only on the periphery of the Soviet Union, but also in the most remote corners of the world the United States is spreading its strong points, preparing bridgeheads for confrontation, and involving potential allies in its wide-scale military preparations. The most bellicose groups of U.S. ruling circles make use of regional conflicts they themselves have inflamed as a justification for their policy of confrontation on a global level and as a pretext for undermining the positive trends in world affairs. They need regional unrest in order to whip up the atmosphere of tension all over the world.

The problem of regional conflicts was discussed in the course of the Soviet-American summit meeting. Both sides expressed concern on this point; since the

development of conflicts carries an implicit threat to international security. However, profound differences were found in the approaches of the USSR and the United States to the causes of conflicts and the methods of eliminating them. On the U.S. side, prevalent was the now anachronistic viewpoint according to which almost any conflict, wherever it arises, is a result of the rivalry between the two world systems. In this connection, the interests of the states of this or that region and the right of people to determine their fate by themselves were ignored. The Soviet state declared its resolute disagreement with such manifestations of imperial thinking.

One of the most important aims of Soviet foreign policy is its principled line of settling regional crisis situations on the basis of respect for the inalienable right of every person to freedom and independence and for the right to independent development without outside interference. The USSR proceeds from the point of the impermissibility of threats and the use of armed force and from the urgent need to liquidate conflicts by peaceful means through a search for mutually acceptable decisions.

Speaking to the heads of diplomatic representations accredited to Moscow at a meeting in the Kremlin on 27 December 1985, M.S. Gorbachev stated: "The Soviet Union has firmly decided to make substantial progress during 1986 on the topic of political settlements in the Near East, in Central America, around Afghanistan, in the South of Africa, and in the Persian Gulf region. We are ready to seek just solutions in cooperation with other countries, and to participate--where this is necessary--in corresponding guarantees."

The political settlement of regional conflict situations can and must become an important support for the strengthening of general security. The community of peoples' security interests is indivisible. Improvement of the situation in any region is beneficial for the state of affairs all over the world.

Nowhere is this law, governing contemporary international life, displayed more convincingly than in Europe. The political climate here largely depends on the development of the entire complex of East-West mutual relations. In turn, the state of all-European affairs has a marked effect on world policy.

Europe's potential for love of peace and its collective state wisdom engendered the policy of international detente and the Helsinki process of strengthening security and developing cooperation. Each European country has made its own contribution. A balance of security interests of the states of Europe and North America has been formed. This is common property, and it is necessary to preserve and augment it through joint efforts and to strive for a shift to more stable, secure relations between states. The Soviet Union and the other socialist states are taking the most active part and are acting to overcome the splitting of Europe into opposing groups in the foreseeable future.

But even in conditions where two military-political alliances exist, it is possible to ensure such a balance of military forces at a lower level as would substantially blunt the acuteness of the present confrontation. The creation of stable conditions of security and confidence on the European continent would make it possible to develop mutually advantageous cooperation in all spheres even more widely and intensively.

Europe's positive experience could serve as an example for other regions, naturally taking their specific nature into account. It stands to reason that the problems and ways of ensuring security form in their own manner in different regions of the world, with the participation of a wide range of interested countries. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is ready to contribute in every way to the creation of reliable security zones all over the world.

The USSR attaches significance to strengthening security in the vast region of Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Together with its socialist allies and friends, it is acting so this region not be a source of tension or a sphere of dangerous military confrontation and in order that the political dialogue widens between all states situated there in the interests of peace, good-neighborliness, mutual trust, and cooperation.

Implementation of the program of nuclear disarmament and liquidation of chemical weapons would fundamentally change the situation in Asia. It would free the people in this part of the globe from the fear of the nuclear and chemical threat and would raise security in the region to a qualitatively new level.

The Nonaligned Movement is capable of making a great contribution to improving the international situation on the Asian Continent and far beyond its frontiers. The Soviet Union is developing comprehensive cooperation with India, which has a positive role here.

The USSR is consistently conducting a principled line in the sphere of Soviet-Chinese relations and is in favor for serious improvement in the relations. It proceeds from a conviction of the need to restore good-neighborliness and comprehensive cooperation with the People's Republic of China, which would correspond to the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese people and would contribute to strengthening security in Asia.

The Soviet Union is in favor of better relations with Japan. This is necessary in the interests of ensuring security in the Asian and Pacific region, and indeed in the interests of eliminating the nuclear threat altogether. The interests of the USSR and Japan cannot but coincide here.

The construction of a general security system requires the wide-scale inclusion of various regions of the world. It can scarcely be expected that movement toward this goal will be rapid and unimpeded. But everywhere--from Central America to the Near East and from the Mediterranean to Southeast Asia--the objective preconditions are being created for a shift from dangerous tension to peaceful mutual relations. The aspiration for reliable security is growing stronger in these regions, and it is being intensified by a trend toward detente and cooperation in all international developments.

There has never before been such a threatening danger in the world as that which now hangs over it in the nuclear age. Neither has there ever been in the past such a need for cooperation to solve problems common to all mankind as that need that now makes itself known as an imperative in our time. For the first time in history, the broadest community of interests of the human species in preventing its own death and in combining efforts for its own good is forming.

It is here that a real possibility of ensuring lasting peace between people exists. In order to transform this possibility into reality, it is necessary to master the skill of living together on our planet, to renounce the inflammation of enmity on the grounds of differences of ideology and social systems, to display mutual restraints, to put an end to confrontation and the arms race, and to strive for general and reliable security.

The course of peace and disarmament has been the pivot of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. In actively conducting it the USSR is ready for the broadest interaction with all who are acting from positions of reason, goodwill, and awareness of the responsibility for ensuring mankind's future without wars and without weapons.

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LIBERAL BRITISH MP RULES OUT NUCLEAR ARMS 'DEALS' WITH USSR

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[By chief political correspondent Chris Moncrieff]

[Text] Liberal Party deputy leader Mr Alan Beith, in Moscow with a group of British parliamentarians, today ruled out "deals on the side" between Britain and the Soviet Union as a means of reducing international tension over nuclear weapons. Mr Beith was speaking after the all-party group had talks at the Kremlin with Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, in which the Soviet leader said Moscow was ready to strike a separate agreement with Britain on cutting nuclear weapons. But Mr Beith said afterward: "The answer to problems of international tension does not lie in deals on the side between Britain and the Soviet Union. Britain's role should lie in helping to bring about a more constructive response from the United States and in ceasing to back such U.S. policies as star wars."

Mr Beith went on: "Mr Gorbachev is in a strong position to achieve a reduction in arms spending, which the Soviet economy badly needs, as part of an agreement which could safeguard the interests of the Western democracies and make the world a safer place. He made it absolutely clear that he is very keen to secure real progress in multilateral disarmament, and, although all the options he has put forward will require considerable further work, Western leaders will be very foolish if they do not show a positive response."

Mr Beith said: "Mr Gorbachev referred to the need to build a bridge from both sides. Mrs Thatcher needs to push the Americans into doing more bridge-building instead of encouraging them to carry on as before."

Mr Beith handed to Mr Gorbachev a letter from Mr David Steel in which the Liberal leader called for an improvement in "the controlled management of our differences". Mr Steel's letter continued: "Irrespective of the United States action in Libya, from which we strongly dissented, or their failure to respond to the ban on test [as received], which you offered and have now extended, it is essential that the Geneva process be taken forward."

My own view is that the freeze option, which you have proposed, would represent a significant step forward. Quite evidently it is not a policy in itself, but it would greatly improve the possibility of longer-term agreement in terms which both the Soviet Union and the Western alliance would regard as providing security and stability."

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